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The 403(B)/457 Plan Requirements Handbook

Freedom and liberty are not merely themes sounded by politicians in political campaigns, or in rousing marches by military bands (though I am personally  particularly fond of them!), nor are they ideas which you will typically see being discussed in a piece about retirement issues. But they are themes woven into the fabric of our our everyday life, without our often even even being aware of them. They form not only the basis of our own civil society, but (believe it or not) are deeply embedded in the holy texts of the major religions. 

But there is a risk nowadays in even referencing these two grand ideas in today's political environment: instead of being viewed as the firm basis of how the vast majority of us quietly operate, they seem to have been outrageously hijacked by political extremists (such as of the libertarian/Ron Paul/ Tea Party sort-and I am none of the above) for some specific end.

In spite of all that, there is something well worth mentioning along these lines about the striking impact of the work we do, something we are not prone to see while working the fine minutiae of our chosen profession.

If we step back for a minute, we can see the extraordinary policy underlying 408(b)(2), the prohibited transaction rules and the exclusive benefit rules (which apply even to non-ERISA plans).  These rules seek to set aside and protect from others the individual wealth of those who accumulate benefits under these plans. It became pretty plain to me while reading Absolute Monarchs, by John Norwich (a history of the Catholic Popes, which really is a brief history of the absolute power of royalty as well as the church over individuals), where, historically, an individual's financial well being was wholly dependent on the whims of powers that be.

We now have something very odd in man's modern history. The value of the funds which are now protected for participants in retirement plans by the Code, ERISA or both approximates 85% of the value of publicly traded securities in the United States.  Though this seemingly huge amount is not yet adequate to establish broad retirement security, it is material enough to take note: these pooled funds are outside of the legal reach of the unaccountable "whims" of those who have something other than the best interests of the participants at heart.  Imagine that. A significant and growing portion of society's wealth is institutionally dedicated in funded pools to the individual's well being, which are difficult to access by an abusive use of power which has so often corrupted society-and jeopardized freedom and liberty-in the past. 

The only way this really works, however, is by things like 408(b)(2); by enforcement of the prohibited transaction rules; and by giving serious attention to the exclusive benefit rules. And all of this is dependent on what appears to be non-sensical minutiae upon which we daily work.

There is a reason I like doing what I do......

 A while back, I did a piece on the manner in which the 408(b)(2) regs applied to the variable investment accounts under a group annuity contract held by a retirement plan, in particular, 401(k)plans; and a "light" piece on its application to general account products. In that I hear more and more rumblings  about the "fixed investment" portion of these accounts under 408(b)(2), it may be helpful to take another, more detailed look at how that reg applies to such accounts.

The first thing that comes to mind when looking at the regs for these purposes is the thing I noted in that previous blog: regardless of what you may think about 408b2 and the requirements now imposed by the rules, this reg has been craftfully drafted. The pieces fit together nicely, and complex issues with regard to investment products have been meaningfully addressed in as simple and direct manner as possible.There may be a few interpretaive issues that need to be resolved (which is to be expected), and 403(b) issues continue to be a serious challenge, but this is a fine piece of technical writing.

So it is with the "guaranteed account," "stable value fund" or "fixed account" within these group annuity contracts.  The 408(b)(2) pieces fit well together.

First, it may be helpful to read my piece on general accounts, and how they work. This can go a long way in understanding why 408b2 applies in the way it does. It is one of my favorites, because it includes a Dick Van Dyke clip from "Mary Poppins." That blog only generally addressed the 408b2 issue.

Next, the fiduciary needs to know whether or not the investment account is a contractual obligation of the insurer,  backed by the "general assets" of the insurer, or if it is part of a "separate account" (see my above noted blog on this). Confusion may arise from the variety of marketing names these funds may be called: the general account product will sometimes be called a "stable value fund" (typically because the crediting rate is set by use of an unrelated, third party index), which may be confused by a "stable value" mutual fund or collective trust interest which is offered under the annuity contract's variable investment separate accounts.

Once you know that fund is a fixed obligation of the insurer from its general account, you need to see what kind of Covered Service Provider (CSP) is the insurer.  It will not be considered an "A" type with regard to the fixed account, because it is not a fiduciary with regard to the management of the assets of the general account backing its contractual promise (a book could be written on this point, alone).  It may be a "B" type of CSP if, under the contract, the insurer is a "recordkeeper."  It will not typically be a "C"  type of CSP because, even though it is insurance, the insurer will not usually receive indirect compensation (as that term is defined by 408b2) related to that account (but keep in mind that these contracts may be part of an annuity where separate accounts are used-and thus indirect comp typically received-for which "C" status may occur). 

What needs to be disclosed?

-If the plan will only buy a group annuity contract with a fixed fund from the insurer, and the insurer will not provide any participant level recordkeeping services, then the insurer may not even be a CSP that will need to report under the new 408(b)(2) regs. The only complication will be the reporting of commissions. 

-If the insurer is a "B" CSP, then two things will need to be reported:  (i) a description of any compensation that will be charged directly against the account balance in connection with the acquisition, sale, transfer of, or withdrawal from the product, like surrender charges; and (ii)  description of any ongoing expenses such as mortality and expense charges or contract charges.

What will NOT need to be reported, however, is any "spread" between the crediting rate under the contract and the investment return on the insurers' general account, as the regs specifically exempt "operating expenses" from needing to be reported from a fixed account.

Didn't say it would be easy, but it all does fit together nicely.....

 

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Any discussion on any tax issue addressed in this blog (including any attachments or links) is not intended to be used, and cannot be used, for purposes of avoiding penalties imposed under the United States Internal Revenue Code or promoting, marketing or recommending to another person any transaction or tax-related position addressed therein. Further, nothing contained herein is intended to provide legal advice, nor to create an attorney client relationship with any party.    

 

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Retirement plan lawyers, both in house and outside counsel, may well want to take note of Bank of New York Mellon's recently reported troubles related to potentially widespread  and fraudulent use of unfair currency exchange rates in their dealings with unsuspecting state and local pension plans.  If there is a basis for these charges, and f they were as widespread and as sustained as alleged to be, we may have our first prime example of how SOX Section 307 and SEC's "Part 205" Rules (which implement Section 307) can implicate employee benefit lawyers. This is because it would be hard to believe that there wasn't a lawyer somewhere in the organization that shouldn't have been aware of the practice (as these rules apply not only to corporate law staffs, but to lawyers in the business lines as well).

Much of the Sarbanes Oxley Act n 2002 ("SOX") was designed to address many of the corporate abuses arising from the Enron, Tyco and Worldcom fiascoes, and it included enhanced protections for corporate whistleblowers.  Buried within this statute was Section 307, an obscure section which imposed duties upon lawyers who deal with publicly traded companies the duty to "report up" certain corporate malfeasance of which they became aware in their practice.  The challenge with these rules is they seem to clash, in many respects, with the state law rules governing the attorney client privilege. In house counsel have challenging enough circumstances, where their client is the corporation and not the officers who seek their counsel.  This awkward pressure merely increased with the passage of SOX. The stakes became higher, as well: failure to report properly would effectively result in a ban from ever representing a publicly traded client, whether in house or as outside counsel.

I wrote an analysis describing the impact of Part 205 on employee benefit lawyers for ALI-ABA in 2005. In that article, I struggled to describe sensible circumstances where benefit lawyers would be impacted, and where the reporting up obligation would be imposed. This is because the only corporate malfeasance required to be reported under SOX are those which would result in a material impact on the company's financials, and it seemed at the time that it would be one heckuva stretch to reach the materiality standard in our line of work.

BNYMellon really is an eye opener. For manufacturing companies, there really is rare opportunity for the employee benefit lawyer to trip Part 205 obligations, other than issues related to underfunded pension plans and executive stock programs.  BNYMellon, however, demonstrates that this is a very real possibility for attorneys representing financial service companies which do retirement business. Considering the fact the value of retirement plan holdings are some 85% of the value of publicly traded securities in the U.S., and where many companies' financial stake in the retirement business continues to grow, it occurs to me that the potential circumstances where SOX may be implicated will only become greater.

Part 205 requires the establishment of written procedures to insure compliance.   Though pure corporate, tax and M&A lawyers have always been well versed in such matters, financial service companies may want to check these procedures to make sure that retirement law staffs (including those in the business lines) are well within the loop.

For those curious on the nuts and bolts of the operations of Part 205 in the employee benefit practice (and there are quite a few), I invite you to read the ALI-ABA paper.

 

 

 

I am, by some serious training and long experience, a corporate lawyer, having been put through the paces by two incredible general counsels: Jack Hunter of Lincoln Financial Group and Scott Campbell of Kellogg Company. Each of these gentleman made quite a study of their attendant Boards and the rules (both formal and informal)  related to their rarefied status. The expectation was that lawyers  dealing with Board matters clearly understood the proper role and culture of "their" Boards.

Every year end I tend to be reminded of this seemingly mundane work (though it is really anything but!) in private practice, as this tends to be the "busy" season when it comes to corporate actions related to plan amendments and other plan activity. Though it may be too late in the year to be useful this year, there are a few thoughts that come to mind which you may hopefully find relevant the next time a plan amendment crosses your desk:

1.  Boards do not manage companies. It is fundamental corporate law that corporate officers run companies, not the Board. Board members have the fiduciary obligation to the shareholders to oversee management; but they do not step into the role of management.  This means that whatever you are looking for the Board to do, it should be generally "big picture,"  such as adopting or terminating the retirement plan. When adopting the plan, try to make sure that a corporate officer has the ability to amend the plan. In larger corporations, this authority will often be subject to certain limits, such as where the benefit is increased.  

2.  Check the minutes.  If you are unsure of who has the authority to amend the plan, check the past Board minutes (if you can find them) to see who has that authority to amend.

3. Rely upon general authority.  If it is not clear who has the authority to amend, you may find guidance in the general authority granted to officers in the bylaws or enabling resolutions as to who may have the authority to amend a plan, absent a specific grant. If you find yourself needing to go in for a Board resolution, take that opportunity to delegate future amendment authority to an officer.

4. Keep details minimal. I recently saw a board resolution that not only adopted a QACA, but also directed the officers to provide required notices. This is patently unacceptable drafting. The officers should be directed, instead,  to take all necessary actions to execute the decision of the board.

5. That fiduciary thing. Make sure that whatever you are asking the Board to do does not constitute a fiduciary action unless you intend it to. One of the worst things you can do to Board members is to inadvertently cause them to have unwanted fiduciary status. Make sure that the authority to act on behalf of the plan is properly delegated to appropriate officers: in the absence of a clear delegation, one would not generally like the DOL or courts to make a de facto finding of inadvertent ERISA fiduciary status of a Bord member.

Related to this are a number of RMD amendments I have been seeing for 403(b) plans, which purport to amend 403(b) plans for the WRERA rule that allowed RMD waivers in 2009.  Some vendors are presenting these amendments to plan sponsors for their signature by year end, as the vendor may have taken it upon itself to generally waive these requirements for those 403(b) customers with individual contracts.

First, it is not clear that such an amendment is needed because, at least for now, you can still incorporate a lot of things by reference-and the inclusion of 401(a)(9) in a 403(b) document should suffice.

Secondly, though, is the bigger problem.  These these carrier provided amendments purport to amend the entire plan. If there are other vendors in the plan  which did NOT offer the RMD waiver, you actually have a plan document problem on your hands if you adopt this broad amendment.

So, be careful; and may your New Year be fruitful, fulfilling and meaningful. 

 

  

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DC Plans and the Recession Inequities

Many in the industry saw early on, and tried to address, the terrible disruption caused by the change in 403(b) regulations during the recession. In many circumstances, the transition to the new rules made amounts in many 403(b) contracts unavailable at a time when many teachers and employees of not-for-profit organizations (who were among the hardest hit by the collapse) needed them the most-as loans, hardship distributions, or terminating distributions during times of often grievous financial circumstances.

401(k) plans did not suffer that fate, and I really believe that this recession would have been many times worse had it not been for those defined contribution balances (including 403(b) plans) which acted as a reserve  for those who lost their jobs. I have not yet seen anyone research on those numbers, but the anecdotal evidence appears strong.

Much of the literature being published today talks of how the recession, and the related capital losses within  DC account balances,  speak strongly of the need to preserve that accumulation from future shocks by using those balances to purchase  guaranteed income products. I cannot disagree more strongly.  Many of you know from my writings that I am a strong supporter of guaranteed lifetime income but, I think instead, that the recession demonstrated the huge value of the DC account balance plan: it provided an invaluable cushion to many at a time they needed it most, which would have been otherwise unavailable in a DB type of arrangement. These plans had not  been so widely available during economic shocks in the past.

But there are, and continue to be, huge inequities related to government policies related to the handling of DC plans throughout the recession.

At a time when it was necessary to provide substantial assistance to large financial institutions in many-and now we found out, often hidden-ways (yes, I am a devotee of Gretchen Morgenson and her weekly column in the New York Times), those who were unemployed continued to pay a 10% penalty tax on their defaulted loans and DC distributions which were taken to keep them afloat. The operation of the 10% was, and is, especially cruel, as it is paid regardless of the application of the marginal rate or deductions. So, even if income was so little as to pay little or no tax, the 10% penalty still applied.

The practical effect is that the unemployed were funding, even if in the smallest part, the assistance to large financial orgs which received substantial government support (and, apparently, paid large bonuses from those funds to many of their still employed executives and traders). Regardless of political persuasion, most should have difficulty with this proposition.

Now, as the economy recovers, and hopefully employment returns, many in Congress speak of reducing the amount that can be put into DC plans. Any reduction will have at least two unintended effects which are little mentioned: it will substantially reduce the ability of re-employed participants to rebuild those depleted balance which helped sustain during the recession; and it will seriously impair the ability of all  to build that so-important-cushion for future financially crises.  I would make the case that the smartest thing Congress could do right now is to increase the DC limit, as least for an interim period, to allow balances to be rebuilt.

We do not hear about this much, as it is being suffered by those without a voice: the unemployed and underemployed; those who are being treated so cruelly by the system in which they had, at one time, been invested. But it is all very real, nonetheless.

 

Keeping it simple and sensible is never an easy task. As a matter of fact, it is extremely difficult to do, particularly when dealing with something as complex as 403(b) regulations. This is why the IRS's recent release of its 8955 FAQ's is so striking: in merely two FAQs,  IRS and Treasury provided answers that not only make regulatory sense and further tax administration, but did it in a way which makes sense for 403(b) plan sponsors. And it surprisingly well co-ordinates with positions the DOL has taken.

TE/GE has spent considerable effort in 403(b) outreach over the past decade, even in face of much cynicism about the enhanced regulatory approach to these plans-developing an unusual amount of knowledge about the marketplace in the process. It clearly tapped into this expertise in developing the FAQs. They could not have been written without a number of highly knowledgeable regulators and auditors recognizing a challenge, and being committed to coming up with a workable solution. I have not, in the past, been shy at commenting on a number of different unfortunate choices staff has made when writing and implementing the 403(b) regulations. This time, however, staff impressed.

The following are the 403(b) questions from the FAQ. Even the most difficult part of them-the part about contracts which cease payments in 2008-arises from the requirements of the 8955 itself, but the IRS found a way to integrate it well. 

Does the Form 8955-SSA filed for 2009 by a 403(b) plan sponsor have to report participants who separated from service prior to 2008 with a deferred vested benefit under the plan?

Generally, no. Form 8955-SSA filed for 2009 generally only has to report participants who separated from service in 2008. Thus, participants with a 403(b) contract or account who separated from service prior to 2008 are not required to be reported on the Form 8955-SSA filed for 2009 (or for any subsequent year).However, a participant should be reported on the Form 8955-SSA filed for 2009 if that participant separated from service in a year before 2008 and began receiving payments under the contract or account, but the payments stopped in 2008 before all of the participant’s benefits were paid. See the Instructions for 2009 Form 8955-SSA. See also Question and Answer 2 for an exception that applies even in the case where payments stopped in 2008. 

 

Does a 403(b) plan sponsor have to report all participants who separated from service after 2007 with a deferred vested benefit under the plan?  

No. A plan sponsor is not required to report a separated participant if the participant’s deferred vested benefits are attributable to an annuity contract or custodial account that is not required to be treated as part of the section 403(b) plan assets for purposes of the reporting requirements of ERISA Title I, as set forth in DOL Field Assistance Bulletin (FAB) 2009-02. 

For this exception  to apply, (1) the contract or account would have to have been issued to a current or former employee before January 1, 2009, (2) the employer would have ceased having any obligation to make contributions (including employee salary reduction contributions), and in fact ceased making contributions to the contract or account before January 1, 2009, (3) all of the rights and benefits under the contract or account would be legally enforceable against the issuer or custodian by the participant without any involvement by the employer, and (4) the participant would have to be fully vested in the contract or account. For further information, please see DOL FAB 2009-02, www.dol.gov/ebsa.

 

There are a couple of important nuances in the application of these rules. I invite you to read Conni's analysis in the Thompson quarterly 403(b)/457newsletter, coming out shortly, where she explains them.

Once again, there are several choices TE/GE could have made when developing its position. It used its knowledge and experience to make some pretty good ones here.

ERISA Accounts, Part 2

 I’ve had a number of responses to my “Timing and the ERISA Account” blog of last week: this topic seems to be front and center with a number of folks right now. Given the sorts of comments I received, I thought I’d expand a bit from that initial, almost cryptic, blog.

“ERISA Accounts,” or “Fee Recapture Accounts,” or “ERISA Budgets” are growing in popularity, and are becoming a frequent feature in the 401(k) and 403(b) space. They take two forms: a “credit” with the plan vendor, where the vendor pays up to a certain, agreed-upon amount for plan administrative services as part of the vendor ”package;’ or the “funded” sort where the vendor actually makes a cash payment to the plan, usually based on some sort of revenue sharing schedule. These typically include 12b-1 fees generated from mutual funds, but may also include such things as surrender charge reimbursements or other negotiated items.

In 2007, the ERISA Advisory Council’s Working Group on Fiduciary Responsibilities and Revenue Sharing Practices issued a report which did a nice job on lying out a number of key issues related to this practice. It also recommended that the DOL issue guidance regarding the treatment of revenue sharing received by a plan, specifically regarding the allocation of revenue sharing received by a plan. The DOL has had its hands full in the past few years, so it is little wonder that it has yet to act on providing this guidance.

There all sorts of issues which come up related to these accounts, but the most pressing of them appears to be associated with the funded accounts: the structure of these accounts within the plan (are they like forfeiture accounts?); the method of the allocation of those funds to participant accounts once expenses have been paid; and the timing of those allocations. My previous blog just addressed the timing issue.

The structure of these funded accounts is actually interesting: recordkeepers aren’t generally accustomed to establishing an employer level account, and many recordkeeping systems are not well suited for this function.  The employer level accounts that do exist are typically forfeiture accounts, and the rules governing them can differ from the ERISA Account-which also means that there are a number of different reasons you want to somehow account for ERISA Account deposits differently than forfeitures. These Accounts probably need to be adopted by some formal action of the plan’s fiduciary, in accordance with the authority it is (hopefully) granted in the plan document, which also discuss how they will be used and eventually allocated. Absent that, the general fiduciary authority within the document will need to be relied upon.

With regard to how these funds may be allocated to participant accounts (particularly where there is an “excess” left after certain plan expenses have been paid. Remember, at least in the funded accounts, they cannot be used for settlor expenses. There are interesting prohibited transaction issues as well if the unfunded credits are used for settlor functions), there seems to be a growing sense that ERISA requires that there be some sort of “matching up” of these allocations with the assets which generated them. There is little doubt that this could be an acceptable method of allocation, and there is at least one vendor which I know of which, very nicely,  closely tracks this.

What seems to be getting lost in the discussion related to these allocations is the fundamental rule that participants only have a beneficial interest in the plan. They have no right to any asset, and they only have the right to direct the investment of their accounts because the employer has decided to let them do so instead of the fiduciary. Any funds generated by those investments are due to the plan, not necessarily to any particular participant. Whatever allocation method is chosen by the fiduciary need only be prudently made. It is telling that in Field Assistance Bulletin 2006-01, the DOL stated that (in addressing the allocation of class action settlement proceeds):

“…. a fiduciary’s decision must satisfy the “solely in the interest of participants” standard of section 404(a)(1) of ERISA. In this regard, a method of allocation would not fail to be “solely in the interest of participants” merely because the selected method may be seen as disadvantaging some affected participants or groups of participants. In deciding on an allocation method, the plan fiduciary may properly weigh the competing interests of various participants or classes of plan participants (e.g., affected versus current participants) and the effects of the allocation method on those participants provided a rational basis exists for the selected method and such method is reasonable, fair and objective.”

In short, though “tying back” the ERISA Account payment to the participant account which generates them will generally be considered prudent (though I can see circumstances where it would not be, such as if it were expensive to do so), and can be a good "market differentiator" for a vendor, I think it is a mistake to claim that this is the result demanded by ERISA.

For all these Accounts, there are also a number of interesting 408(b)(2), Schedule C and Schedule A issues with which plan sponsors and vendors must cope-and which I will not address here.

 

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Any discussion on any tax issue addressed in this blog (including any attachments or links) is not intended to be used, and cannot be used, for purposes of avoiding penalties imposed under the United States Internal Revenue Code or promoting, marketing or recommending to another person any transaction or tax-related position addressed therein. Further, nothing contained herein is intended to provide legal advice, nor to create an attorney client relationship with any party.   


Timing and the ERISA Account

It is not often that one gets to hearken back to the very basic law governing 401(a) plans in addressing an issue, but one of the key questions related to the funding of “ERISA Accounts” provides just such an opportunity. One of the most fascinating of the issues related to these accounts (and there are a number of them coming out of the woodwork as their popularity grows, as well as a number of thoughtful papers being written on these accounts) is the question of how long can the funds can remain in the ERISA Account before needing to be allocated to participant accounts.

We know that the IRS has taken a clear position on the timing of the “spend down” of a forfeiture account, and that funds in the forfeiture account must generally be allocated within the plan year that forfeiture is made (this rule, by the way, would not apply to 403(b) plans). But this is based on 401(a)(8) and the required treatment of forfeitures of contributions under 1.401-7(a)- and the ERISA Account deposit is not a forfeiture. We also know that the DOL has, at least on one occasion, deferred to the prudence standard (see, for example, FAB 2006-1) in managing these accounts.

We do know that a plan document needs to contain language outlining the management of the ERISA Account (and that the Account should be accounted for separately from the forfeiture account), unless the fiduciary is otherwise able to establish procedures under its general fiduciary authority. But what should be the standard under the Code that the plan should adopt?

I think the answer goes back to the “exempt purpose” rules which govern tax-exempt organizations. If I recall my research as a first year associate in Detroit with the good Rasul Raheem, Dr. Willard Holt, Richard Smart and Roland Bessette, under the tutelage of the fine Stan Kirk, the trust of a 401(a) plan is, after all, an exempt organization under 501(a), and the assets of a tax exempt organization are to be used in the fulfillment of the organization’s exempt purpose.  The exempt purpose of a 401(a) trust is, of course, to provide a pension or profit sharing benefit exclusively for employees or their beneficiaries. So, hanging on to the funds in this ERISA Account for too long and not using them for providing this benefit or supporting the operation of the plan would be a failure to use the assets of the "exempt organization" in furtherance of the trust’s exempt purpose. This, ultimately, really leaves you with that “reasonable” period that the DOL suggests to be the standard.

This may also mean that there may not be a standard for a non-ERISA 403(b) plans (as they are neither not subject to 401(a) or the fiduciary standards of ERISA). Any effort to impose a standard would have to be related somehow to the failure to purchase an annuity for an employee. But that may not even matter, for the tax exempt organization would not be otherwise taxed on that amount anyway, and it is not an event which would disqualify the plan.

With 403(b) plans in mind, by the way, make sure the 403(b) ERISA Account is invested in mutual funds or in an annuity account, not just to some holding account at a financial institution. See my blog on “The Trouble With 403(b) Cash.”

I knew that research I first did years ago when trying to figure out how a pension fund worked would eventually turn out to be useful sometime…….

 

 

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Any discussion on any tax issue addressed in this blog (including any attachments or links) is not intended to be used, and cannot be used, for purposes of avoiding penalties imposed under the United States Internal Revenue Code or promoting, marketing or recommending to another person any transaction or tax-related position addressed therein. Further, nothing contained herein is intended to provide legal advice, nor to create an attorney client relationship with any party.   

 

 

Section 939A of Dodd Frank has a very interesting mandate to federal agencies. It requires federal agencies to review their regulations to determine those which require the use of a credit-agency rating in assessing the credit-worthiness of a security and:

“Each such agency shall modify any such regulations identified by the review conducted under subsection (a) to remove any reference to or requirement of reliance on credit ratings and to substitute in such regulations such standard of credit-worthiness as each respective agency shall determine as appropriate for such regulations.….”

This mandate, to my mind, is justified.   A number of practices of financial service companies (and, apparently, governments) are often geared to obtaining the favor of the (sometimes conflicted) rating agency, sometimes even acting as a substitute for their officers' better business judgment. There is pressure to defer to the ratings agency’s thoughts about the financial company’s business, even though the agency may well not fully understand the business of the companies they assess. Those rating agencies, and their opinions, are far short of infallible- and may often be seriously flawed.

This plays out in any interesting way in the development of a fiduciary standard for the purchase of lifetime income products for defined contribution plans. In developing any annuity fiduciary regulation, the DOL will likely be unable to reference rating agency standards (even when issuing prohibited transaction exemptions, it noted that it is “cognizant…. of the Congressional intent to reduce reliance on credit ratings and is considering alternative standards for use instead of, or in addition to, existing requirements for credit ratings in granted individual prohibited transaction exemptions").

I had blogged a few months back on the development of such an annuity standard, and had suggested extensive reference to the credit ratings. Thinking it through, however, I now realize I was just using a “lazy man’s” way out to make the standard sound more legitimate.  In reality, actual ratings may or may not be relevant as, somtimes, the higher rating is not necessarily the best for the plan or the participants. A classic circumstance is where the “cost” of getting the higher rating (by means, for example, of establishing higher reserves) on the annuity product results in a higher priced annuity-without necessarily any commensurate, and real, increase in “safety.”

So, let me recast my suggestions for a safe harbor. 

The DOL could require, as part of a safe harbor, that the insurance company which provides the annuity product being purchased by the plan should be prepared to describe to the fiduciary the following, in terms the fiduciary can understand:

-Provide an explanation of any assessment of its financial condition that independent third parties have provided to it, or have been disclosed to a regulatory authority (such as the state insurance department) without reference to any rating which as been assigned to it.

-Describe any material changes in its financial condition in the past five years and describe why. Have those changes affected the interest rate upon which annuity pricing is based? 

-Explain how the state guaranty association rule would apply to the company’s product being sold.

- Describe material outcomes of the most recent state insurance exams.

-Explain the level of reserves, and why they were chosen.

-Describe the risk profile of the investment portfolio that supports the annuity contracts.

In a vacuum, the answers to these questions may mean little to the fiduciary. However, when compared to the answers of a competing insurance company, they could take on a quite a bit of relevance.

The fiduciary would use the answers using these sort of standardized questions (and a few others), focusing on the close details that are indicative of financial strength (or trouble), to arrive at a prudent decision-especially when used to compare the answers of other insurers.  It could possibly have the effect of putting insurance more into the vernacular and make it an extremely useful safe harbor. It could act to help guide fiduciaries through some of the dense and often arcane material that is related to insurance, and to help sort out what is impotent’s to what really is important. 

 

 

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Any discussion on any tax issue addressed in this blog (including any attachments or links) is not intended to be used, and cannot be used, for purposes of avoiding penalties imposed under the United States Internal Revenue Code or promoting, marketing or recommending to another person any transaction or tax-related position addressed therein. Further, nothing contained herein is intended to provide legal advice, nor to create an attorney client relationship with any party.   

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Guest Blog:  Linda Segal Blinn on 403(b)

 

Writing a blog on technical/legal/regulatory issues can be daunting. You want the information to be right, but you also want it to be understandable (and in as few words as possible) to the professional who wants to be able to use the information you are trying to provide.  This is why the writings of Linda Segal Blinn caught my attention. A well known professional in the 403(b) world, her technical writings are straightforward, accurate, understandable and make the point well. There are few technical writers who have this skill set.

Linda has graciously accepted my invitation to write something of importance for this blog,  even getting corporate approval to do so. Her following piece on 403(b) plan documents is very timely particularly given that the IRS is now auditing for compliance with the new plan document rules.

 Thank you Linda.  

 

“Planning to Amend”

by Linda Segal Blinn, JD

Vice President of Technical Services, ING

 

“Just do it” may work as an athletic slogan, but it doesn’t always work so well with plan documents.

 Certainly, “just do it” was the reminder to 403(b) sponsors in 2009.  In that year, the IRS’ 403(b) regulations became effective and, with it, the written plan requirement, regardless of an employer’s ERISA status.  As a result, with the limited exception of certain church plans, 501(c)(3) organizations and public schools were reminded – whether through IRS outreach efforts, industry associations, service providers and/or their own counsel – of the importance of adopting a 403(b) plan that folded in these IRS requirements no later than December 31, 2009.

 And so, by and large, sponsors have done what the IRS has asked of them by adopting a written 403(b) plan that reflects the IRS regulations.  In doing so, these employers also had choices to make – did they want to offer a Roth 403(b) feature?  What about loans, hardships, rollovers in, and the like?   Decisions were made, and employers were able to check off that they had timely adopted their 403(b) plan by the IRS’ regulatory due date.

 But a 403(b) plan document is not a “set it and forget it” kind of document.  Yes, it will need to be updated periodically to reflect new tax laws.  To that end, the IRS, industry associations, service providers and tax advisors will again reach out to these employers to remind them of new deadlines to do so.  However, lost in the flurry of paper as employers rushed to adopt their 403(b) plan documents is this important reminder: if an employer wants to tweak plan design, rather than regulatory provisions, the plan document must be amended for that as well.  

 I was reminded of this recently when reviewing a 403(b) plan document.  While the plan document stated that an IRS safe harbor definition would be used, it turned out that, in fact, the plan had just switched over to using a homegrown definition that was perfectly acceptable, given the employer’s objectives. 

 “Is that a problem?” was the predictable question when the discrepancy between plan in form and plan in operation was pointed out.  Well, yes and no.  Both the Internal Revenue Code and ERISA provide that an employer must operate its plan in accordance with the terms of that plan.  Yes, deviating from plan terms is technically not allowed and would make the plan defective.  But adopting a simple amendment to the plan would resolve the matter.  So, perhaps this is not so much a problem as a need for a minor repair.

 And this is where the word needs to get out to 403(b) sponsors. Choice is good and choosing the design features that best fit your plan’s needs is important.  But just as important is not losing sight that if you decide to revisit those choices, you will also need to make sure that you fold those changes into the 403(b) plan document to remain compliant with IRS and ERISA rules.  While “just do it” should create a healthy environment, “just renew it” may be an even better motto for avoiding a plan document defect.

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 (This material was created to provide accurate information on the subjects covered.  It is not intended to provide specific legal, tax or other professional advice. The services of an appropriate professional should be sought regarding your individual situation.  These materials are not intended to be used to avoid tax penalties, and were prepared to support the promotion or marketing of the matters addressed in this document.  The taxpayer should seek advice from an independent tax advisor.)

 

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Linda Segal Blinn is Vice President of ING's Technical Services. In this capacity, Blinn supervises the provision of legislative, regulatory, and compliance information to assist employers in operating their retirement plans.  Linda's expertise includes administering and designing defined contribution plans in conformance with the Internal Revenue Code and ERISA.

 

 

 

 

The Uncommon MEP

 Since we first published a MEP whitepaper with TAG Resources a few months back, where TAG coined the term “Open MEP,” much has happened in this marketplace. Most recently, Drinker Biddle published its own (very good) whitepaper on this topic, very much affirming, and going into closer detail on, many of the broad points we had raised in the TAG paper.  

As you can imagine, we have spent a lot of time working on this issue so as to come to a measure of comfort on how ERISA applies to multiple employer employee pension benefit plans ("MEPs"). I think we have.
 
ERISA and its regulations specifically lay out the rules which must be met for “an employer or employers” to adopt a single defined contribution multiple employer plan.These rules are extensive, effectively acting as a set of MEP qualification rules. Interestingly enough, in order to actually qualify as an ERISA MEP, the regs under ERISA Section 210 actually require that the plan first meet the rules under 413(c)-including being treated as a single plan under the Code. Here’s the “qualification” list:
 
  • More than one employer.
  • Single plan under the Code.
  • Non-collectively bargained.
  • Application of minimum coverage, vesting,  participation, non-discrimination, and benefit accrual rules in a particular way.
  • Entire plan must be able to be disqualified by one participating employer.
   
With a plan that meets the MEP rules, there are really two ways for an “employer or employers” to actually adopt it and still be honored as a single plan. 
 
The first is the Open MEP model, where an employer directly adopts the plan on behalf of its own employees.  Here, each employer adopting the MEP, including the Lead Employer, has employees who are covered by the plan.  Each employer is acting, under ERISA 3(5), on their own behalf, each for the benefit of their own employees. Simple and straight forward, no so-called "commonality" requirement to qualify as an employer. 
 
The second way to adopt a MEP, it seems to me, is the classic association model. A “person” which is not otherwise an employer adopting a plan for its own employees as an employer, adopts a MEP on behalf of other employers (with employees) that have authorized it to do so. This would not cause much of a problem under 3(5), as it is not such a stretch to recognize a “person” acting on behalf of a single employer. This is clearly permitted under ERISA Section 3(5).  But a single "person" acting on behalf of multiple employers for their employees seems to create an awkward problem:  can one "person" be seen acting as a single "employer" for many employers without there being some sort of common employment relationship between those employers appointing it? Though this may happen in other legal contexts, it is not something for which regulatory guidance has ever been developed under ERISA outside of the collectively bargained arena. Under these circumstances, then, the Advisory Opinions addressing who may act as an "employer"-and the "commonality rule"-make some sense. 
 
Does this mean, though, that all that one of those abusive MEWAs sponsors (upon which most of the DOL Advisory opinions on the definition of "employer" were based) would need to do is to cover an employee of their own organization in order to achieve ERISA MEWA status? I don’t think so. First, ERISA’s preemption rules have (since 1983) permitted state insurance rules to apply to insured MEWAs, thus eliminating the area of the most abuse. Achieving ERISA status for the abusive plans makes little difference anymore.  More importantly, though, ERISA SEction 514(b)(6) gives the DOL the authority to establish rules by which it would recognize (or not recognize) a non-insured MEWA  as a single plan under ERISA 3(1). Though the lead plan sponsor may be an employer under such an approach, there is nothing within the regs recognizing it as a single plan.
 
MEPs, however, are much different. There are regulations which establish a specific set of rules authorizing the adoption of a single employee pension benefit plan by multiple, unrelated employers under certain circumstances.  There are no such specific rules for adopting a welfare plan for multiple employers.  In the absence of such specific rules, MEWA promoters have to resort to cobbling together  the general rules of ERISA to justify such an arrangement.  It appears that, at least from one of the Advisory Opinions, the DOL may well treat any group of multiple employers which attempt to adopt a single welfare plan as an association which must meet the "employer" rules.  This seems well within the DOL's authority to do (at least they have the authority to establish regulations on this point) particularly as an anti-abuse rule.
 
It seems that, after working it through a bit,  the DOL's approach to multiple employer arrangements are generally well founded, particularly as they apply to MEWAs.  Under the analysis above, an Open MEP can and should be accorded much different treatment than MEWas, and can be adopted by employers acting on their own behalf. An association, however,  may need to continue to comply with the "commonality" rules if they are not operating under an Open MEP.  
 
As an aside, something to note: ERISA Section 210 and Code Section 413(c) do not apply to 403(b) plans, which then may mean that it would  require an association of sorts to be able to adopt a single, multiple employer 403(b) plan. It would not, otherwise, be an ERISA MEP (a MEP under ERISA must fall under Code Section 413(c)).   It may be that the plan will need to be organized around the concept of employers actively governing the plan, belong to a bona fide association, or have employment bonds beyond the plan itself, unless the DOL issues other guidance.  
 
 

In the summer of 1999, I left my position as in-house counsel for an insurance company and returned to the private practice of law. As a result, I rolled the funds held in my 401k plan into an IRA. I was a complete novice when it came to investing at the time but had recently heard a commentator on NPR claim the rise of the Internet represented a paradigm shift in the global economy. Based upon this information, I moved half of my retirement funds into a “New Economy Fund” and the other half into a “ContraFund.”   When the dot.com bubble burst a year later, I realized I could have fared just as well if I had flushed half of my money down the toilet and stuck the other half under my mattress.

Several years later, one of my friends – a Vice President in the Claims Department of my prior employer – decided to retire. The company was owned by General Electric at the time, and its 401(k) plan offered a surprisingly paltry array of investment options - most of which were dogs. Because the price of GE stock had skyrocketed under Jack Welsh’s leadership, my friend chose to roll all of his retirement plan funds into GE stock. A year later, he too would have been in about the same shape as if he had flushed half his funds down the toilet. 

Needless to say, my friend and I would have benefited greatly from the counsel of an investment professional at the time we made these decisions. However, no advisor reached out to us and, now that I have spent the past several years providing legal counsel to advisors in the retirement plan industry, I understand why.

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In Robert Pirsig’s novel, Zen and The Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, the protagonist was a technical manual writer who went insane.  The author commented that the book had little relation to either Zen or motorcycle maintenance.  But at the core of the story was the minutiae which eventually drove him mad: to any explanation he could write in any of his manuals, he could always ask the question “why?”

Similarly, on the topic of annuity regulation in DC plans, minutiae is central to the theme. It is in dwelling there, though, is  where I believe that many of the solutions to the public policy challenges raised by this topic can be found. I just hope it doesn’t drive us mad as well…
 
It may seem to some a bit silly to compare annuity regulation to a classic, modern philosophical tome, but its really not. The answer to the questions at which the regulators will arrive will affect an awful lot of people and businesses for an awfully long time. (For my view on how  technical regs reflect important policy, I invite you to read one of my personal favorites-but least read-blogs, Erisa and Mom, which I try to publish every Mother’s Day). You see, what regulators are really doing are attempting to find the right balance between availability, flexibility and securing critical participant retirement rights. As automotive engineers have told me on more than one occasion (yes, I am Imported From Detroit-and have a T-shirt to prove it), every design decision is a trade-off. So for example, you can’t have the safest and most cost/fuel efficient car at the same time (imagine the Bradley fighting vehicle as the family minivan. Beside lousy fuel mileage and high operating costs, it would be hell on the road systems. But it sure would be safe in a collision).  
 
There are a few guiding principles I would think (with the fear of being far too presumptuous, as reg writing is a skill with which I have NO experience) might apply in delving into the minutiae for solutions. For example, it may be helpful  to follow Asimov's Minimum Necessary Change concept. It could also be useful to keep in mind that not all annuity based guarantees are created equal (for example, does high water mark protection deserve the same policy treatment as guaranteed lifetime income?), nor are all annuity types suitable for retirement plans. At the same time, it is important to preserve the ability of the market to continue to develop innovative (and suitable) retirement products, and for plans to readily adopt them. Finally, if at all possible, keep it as simple as possible-as the DOL has recently been accomplishing with a measure of success. 
 
So, with all that, here are some thoughts what some annuity regulations could look like.

 

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Testing of the MEP Waters

In blogging, I don't typically write about informal conversations I have had with anyone, including government staff, friends or colleagues, without first discussing it with them.  I fear that otherwise I would indeed lead a lonely life, as who would ever talk with me if there was a chance that conversation would end up on the internet the next day? 

In spite of this, I've chosen to write  about a discussion with DOL staff today only because I really think it would be helpful to add a bit more color  to Ilene Ferenczy's newsletter on "Clues From the Ivory Tower," a well written piece on on the ASPPA meetings with the DOL where issues on multiple employer plans were raised, among others.
 
Ilene appropriately and accurately describes the conversation with the DOL on MEPS in her newsletter, but reactions on the social networks to her newsletter has lead me to think that a little more context may be useful to more fully understanding the conversation. 
 
I was at the same meeting as Ilene. The question arose as to whether a non-association MEP would qualify as a single plan under ERISA, so to enable a single Form 5500, single audit, and a host of other things. DOL staff's reaction was that they believed that a non-benefit related commonality is needed, but they also expressed a willingness to discuss the idea. We explored several different points.
 
To be fair to the DOL staff, they were presented with the question almost as an afterthought, and staff had not been put on notice that we were looking for a thoughtful response. Likewise, we did not intend to prepare a case for why the answer should be one way or another. It was truly an initial response, to a sort of testing the waters on our part, with DOL staff asking follow up questions exploring why they should rule differently than with the MEWAs.
 
There is little doubt that any 413(c) MEP, including the non-association MEP, has substantial commonality. My ASPPA webcast next week will outline those, but includes vesting, participation, exclusive benefit and a few other things-413(c) even has the DOL drafting special break-in-service rules for 413c, which- I think-never have been written.
 
What it boils down to is actually a narrow question: should ERISA 3(5) be read to require a non-benefits based commonality. That is the concern raised by DOL staff. In my view, the language of ERISA does not require this, nor is there any regulation that does it.  What seems to be the genesis of  this narrow construction was based upon sound public policy: it  was necessary to stop those abusive healthcare MEWAs from continuing to harm participants who were purchasing non-existent health care coverage.  That narrow construction worked well to "plug the dike" until Congress stepped in to change the MEWA rules without requiring the DOL to engage in contortions.
 
The DOL has not ruled (either by Advisory Opinion or informal guidance) on what should be required under ERISA for a 413c plan to be recognized as a single ERISA plan, using the definition of employer under ERISA 3(5).  413c, unlike the MEWA rules, requires substantial commonality to qualify under the Code section as a single plan, but it is a benefits based commonality-one which the DOL position argues against.
 
From a purely policy perspective, as long as the ERISA rules are followed properly, a MEP can actually enhance the compliance that MEWAs were attempting to avoid. Think about it. It really is about professionals now willing to serve as the 3(16) Administrator-after years of TPAs and other professionals (acting on advice of us lawyers) making sure they WEREN'T serving in this role. Now, there appears to be a real market need for it.
 

So, the DOL's initial, and informal, position is that a non-benefits commonality is required for a 413c MEP-I believe in large part because of the long line of of well established MEWA rulings saying so. I think the answer should be otherwise, as supported by the IRS regulatory structure under 413c of what constitutes a single plan, which is substantially different than the MEWA rules (or lack thereof) upon which the DOL position seems to be based. I suspect there will be some parties making this case to the DOL, in a much better prepared manner, and I would expect, over time, a thoughtful response from the DOL once they have reviewed things. But this means before one sets up a new MEP, one should do it with knowledge that the DOL may eventually not agree with this position. But there are a number of very large plans n the market already, so even the DOL's nonacquiesence may not be the end of it. Even the GAO has taken an interest, and is doing initial research on whether these MEPS are a good tool to deepen retirement plan penetration in the small end of the marketplace.

Stay tuned, and step cautiously.  

 

 

Any discussion on any tax issue addressed in this blog (including any attachments or links) is not intended to be used, and cannot be used, for purposes of avoiding penalties imposed under the United States Internal Revenue Code or promoting, marketing or recommending to another person any transaction or tax-related position addressed therein. Further, nothing contained herein is intended to provide legal advice, nor to create an attorney client relationship with any party.   

 

IRS Extends 8955-SSA Deadline

 Important Update to last blog posting. On June 21, IRS announced the extension of the 8955-SSA deadline to January 17, 2011, for which no Form 58 extension will need to be filed. The announcement is here.

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