Business of Benefits : Employee Benefits Lawyer & Attorney : Law Office of Robert J. Toth, Jr. : 403(b) Plans, Annuity & Insurance Law : Business of Benefits Blog

Freedom and liberty are not merely themes sounded by politicians in political campaigns, or in rousing marches by military bands (though I am personally  particularly fond of them!), nor are they ideas which you will typically see being discussed in a piece about retirement issues. But they are themes woven into the fabric of our our everyday life, without our often even even being aware of them. They form not only the basis of our own civil society, but (believe it or not) are deeply embedded in the holy texts of the major religions. 

But there is a risk nowadays in even referencing these two grand ideas in today's political environment: instead of being viewed as the firm basis of how the vast majority of us quietly operate, they seem to have been outrageously hijacked by political extremists (such as of the libertarian/Ron Paul/ Tea Party sort-of which I am not so inclined) for some specific end.

In spite of all that, there is something well worth mentioning along these lines about the striking impact of the work we do, something we are not prone to see while working the fine minutiae of our chosen profession.

If we step back for a minute, we can see the extraordinary policy underlying 408(b)(2), the prohibited transaction rules and the exclusive benefit rules (which apply even to non-ERISA plans).  These rules seek to set aside and protect from others the individual wealth of those who accumulate benefits under these plans. It became pretty plain to me while reading Absolute Monarchs, by John Norwich (a history of the Catholic Popes, which really is a brief history of the absolute power of royalty as well as the church over individuals), where, historically, an individual's financial well being was wholly dependent on the whims of powers that be.

We now have something very odd in man's modern history. The value of the funds which are now protected for participants in retirement plans by the Code, ERISA or both approximates 85% of the value of publicly traded securities in the United States.  Though this seemingly huge amount is not yet adequate to establish broad retirement security, it is material enough to take note: these pooled funds are outside of the legal reach of the unaccountable "whims" of those who have something other than the best interests of the participants at heart.  Imagine that. A significant and growing portion of society's wealth is institutionally dedicated in funded pools to the individual's well being, which are difficult to access by an abusive use of power which has so often corrupted society-and jeopardized freedom and liberty-in the past. 

The only way this really works, however, is by things like 408(b)(2); by enforcement of the prohibited transaction rules; and by giving serious attention to the exclusive benefit rules. And all of this is dependent on what appears to be non-sensical minutiae upon which we daily work.

There is a reason I like doing what I do......

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I would think that it is a basic law of physics that, whenever you attempt to apply a number of different and complicated principles to a single object, that the consequences on that object will be hard to predict, or even readily ascertained.

So it is with a potential impact 408(b)(2) may have on many 501(c)(3) sponsors of ERISA 403(b) plans. It shows up when you take an 403(b) ERISA plan, impose a fundamentally new set of basic principles (by way of the 2007 403(b) tax regulations); revoke its exemptive relief  from reporting requirements (the Form 5500); while nearly simultaneously superimposing a tremendous new disclosure scheme (participant and service provider disclosures);  there are inevitably going to be some unusual results.

Take a typical example. A hospital sponsors an ERISA 403(b) plan with 10,000 current employees. Over time, it has merged with a number of different hospitals, each which had separately maintained its own 403(b) arrangements in the past with a wide number of vendors. The hospital, in anticipation of the problems with the 2007 tax regulations, consolidated all the affiliates plans into a single platform on 1/1/2009.

Over its history, though, it and its affiliated hospitals had selected and deselected a number of other vendors (no one is quite sure how many) many with whom they have long lost contact.

All of these contracts over the history of the plans have been owned by the individual participants. Though the employer did have an audit done, it did not report many of those "lost" deselected vendor contracts, as it didn't know much about them or the vendors. They reported those old plans as merging with the 2009 Form 5500.

The deselected vendors all still have some old contracts that participants have hung onto,  even after those participants have left the employee of the hospital. The records of the vendor shows that these were ERISA contracts, and that they earn a "mortality and expense", or some other contract charge, and they are indeed "recordkeepers" for the investments in those contracts as defined by 408(b)(2). In order to prevent that compensation from being prohibited, and from the need to be prudent, the vendor decides to make the required disclosures to the hospital's "responsible plan fiduciary-" with whom they have not had contact for many years.

Imagine that fiduciary's surprise when it receives these "blasts from the past," the ghosts of decisions made long ago, often by folks with which they were never affiliated with at the time decisions were made. 

The hospital never knew about these contracts for which they are receiving disclosures, but can't ignore them.  They have just completed all of their work with regard to participant fee disclosures, but now someone is telling them that there may be a dozen more companies' investment products upon which they have to report. They also just filed their 2010 Form 5500, and didn't report many of these contracts as assets of the plan.  

Now what? This is just one scenario, they are others which may be likely once vendors seek to comply with 408(b)(2) on their books of old ERISA contracts. Though the regulator view may be that this flushing of old contracts is a good thing, it can actually be quite a mess to sort through-including whether or not you still have relief and can exclude them from compliance responsibility under Rev Proc.2007-71, and just at a time when the IRS is beginning their 403(b) 2009 audits. I suspect that the management of the problems can only resolved by closely looking at all of the particular facts which will apply to the plan.

I leave it to your imagination as to the myriad of difficulties this may cause; as there are potentially many. I also may be wrong, and this may never happen.......

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 Generally unnoticed in the DOL’s proposed fiduciary reg was the implicit recognition that the commissioned based sales function is important to the operation of the market, and that you can “sell” until the cows come home (a good friend tells me, by the way, that the cows actually do eventually come home),  or until you become a fiduciary.  Anyone familiar with the successful salesperson knows that they are only able to sell once they establish a level of trust with the plan fiduciary, which is why trade organizations are taking the DOL to task on the requirement that the salesperson, in order to be recognized as not being a fiduciary, must then advise the fiduciary (with whom a relationship is being forged) that he or she may have adverse interests to the plan.

However that language is eventually finalized, it raises an important question that hasn't really been addressed well, being a sort of red-haired stepchild of ERISA: Just what is “sales”and how are commissions treated? Finding your way through it can be trying, as if its a practice in ERISA metaphysics, mysticism and alchemy.

It starts with the basic question of whether or not “sales” is considered a service. It does seems almost metaphysical, and would be amusing if it didn't have a very real impact.   Commissions from pure sales of an investment product to a plan from a party without an existing relationship to a plan (either on its own or through an affiliate) does not seem to be governed either by 408(b)(2) or by the prohibited transaction rules.  “Sales,” by itself does not seem to be a service covered by 408(b)(2), and the payment of a commission to a someone who is not a party of interest may raise fiduciary concerns if too much is paid, but it is NOT, in itself, a prohibited transaction.  But there are times where sales and the payment of commission may eventually be considered services, where there becomes an ongoing, supportive relationship.

Lets go over some “pure sales” scenarios, with the impact of “sales as service” perhaps being handled in a future blogs:

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The DOL's newly delayed 408(b)(2) regs are particularly striking in that they demonstrate a growing sophistication, and efficiency, on the part of the EBSA staff in its approach to retirement plan financial products and services. The regs are short, by almost any measure of federal regulations, yet they are packed with meaningful rules which will apply in different ways to different product and services.  

The marketplace is a fast moving one, with complex instruments and services being used in new and unusual ways. Keeping up with this whirlwind is a challenge for the industry and employers, let alone a government regulatory agency which must somehow craft rules which have broad application to ever-shifting, complex and unanticipated circumstances.  Though not always successful, the DOL is approaching its learning curves impressively-including the way in which continues to seek to know and understand what it does not.

A prime example of this is the manner in which the 408b2 rules apply to variable investment accounts within the annuity contracts used to fund 403(b), 401(k) and other 401(a) plans. What is fascinating is that the word "annuity" only shows up with regard to IRAs;  the words "individual," "group," "variable," "fixed," "registered," or "non-registered"-all of which are descriptors of a variety of different sorts of annuity contracts- never show up; and the word "insurance" only appears once. Yet, it provides clear guidance on how these investment products are to be regulated. 

Lets take a quick look at the way the rules apply differently to registered variable annuity separate accounts (lets call these "Type 1" for purposes of this blog) typically used in the 403(b) market, and the way they apply to non-registered variable annuity separate accounts (which I'll call "Type 2") typically used in 401(k) plans.

This, by the way, is important for plan sponsors to know because they have to sort out whether they are receiving the disclosures they need, and report it to the DOL if they are not.

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Lurking darkly in the background behind all the recent discussions of fee disclosure and how the prohibited transaction rules apply under 408(b)(2), is something most of us in the benefits world typically pay little attention to: the U.S. Criminal Code.

We all have a general knowledge that kickbacks and racketeering schemes of any sort are illegal.  But many do not realize that there is a specific "anti-kickback" rule applying to ERISA plans that is NOT found in ERISA, but instead under criminal law.  I invite you to read the following. I rarely cite the entire section of any statute, but the language of this one is so striking (and so unfamiliar to most of us, and not referenced in most benefits books), I thought it would provide useful reading. This section, by the way, only applies to ERISA plans: 

18 USC §1954. Offer, acceptance, or solicitation to influence operations of employee benefit plan

 

Whoever being—

(1) an administrator, officer, trustee, custodian, counsel, agent, or employee of any employee welfare benefit plan or employee pension benefit plan; or

(2) an officer, counsel, agent, or employee of an employer or an employer any of whose employees are covered by such plan; or

(3) an officer, counsel, agent, or employee of an employee organization any of whose members are covered by such plan; or

(4) a person who, or an officer, counsel, agent, or employee of an organization which provides benefit plan services to such plan

receives or agrees to receive or solicits any fee, kickback, commission, gift, loan, money, or thing of value because of or with intent to be influenced with respect to, any of the actions, decisions, or other duties relating to any question or matter concerning such plan or any person who directly or indirectly gives or offers, or promises to give or offer, any fee, kickback, commission, gift, loan, money, or thing of value prohibited by this section, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both:

Provided, That this section shall not prohibit the payment to or acceptance by any person of bona fide salary, compensation, or other payments made for goods or facilities actually furnished or for services actually performed in the regular course of his duties as such person, administrator, officer, trustee, custodian, counsel, agent, or employee of such plan, employer, employee organization, or organization providing benefit plan services to such plan. 

The language of the statute is broad, and looks at first glance to be able to cover a number of poorly designed compensation schemes or service arrangements. We all know that doing something as foolish as buying a plan sponsor a car in order to keep its 401(k) business would clearly step over the line. But there some other, and familiar, arrangements which could raise some issues.

Take, for example, a sales rep which has no service agreement with a plan and who is compensated solely by commissions. Let us say this rep gets word that a 401(k) client is considering moving its business to a different vendor (and a different sales rep). The rep approaches the clients and offers to pick the TPA fees of the plan if the plan continues to purchase the investment products through him.  It is clear that this kind of arrangement can be sound when it is made properly part of a negotiated service agreement with a plan vendor.  But with a sales rep without a service agreement- a problem?

Another example could be "tying" arrangements, where a bank has a client's 401(k) plan as well as holding a corporate loan with the plan sponsor.  The plan sponsor notifies the bank that it is moving its 401(k) to another institution. The bank responds by threatening to call the loan, or not to extend any future credit if the 401(k) plan is moved- a problem?

This is a criminal statute. Unlike the "civil law" ERISA prohibited transaction rules where "intent" doesn't matter,  "scienter" (that is, intent) is still a critical element.  But still the word is caution.  Compliant compensation schemes are difficult enough to design, given the prohibited transaction rules and the forthcoming 408(b)(2) regs. But don't forget about the non-ERISA criminal rules when addressing these issues.

If, by the way, you find yourself in these sorts of circumstances, it would be helpful to go talk to your lawyer.

__________________________

Any discussion on any tax issue addressed in this blog (including any attachments or links) is not intended to be used, and cannot be used, for purposes of avoiding penalties imposed under the United States Internal Revenue Code or promoting, marketing or recommending to another person any transaction or tax-related position addressed therein. Further, nothing contained herein is intended to provide legal advice, nor to create an attorney client relationship with any party.   

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