I have a statue of an elephant on my office credenza. It is actually an exotic little contraption, a bank, where a coin placed on its spring-loaded trunk will be deposited in the elephant. It was a gift to me from a consultant friend of mine, after I told him about my experience with a number of major financial software conversions. Dealing with the fallout from system conversions, I explained, is like cleaning up after elephants (after recalling an incident I had witnessed involving some poor photographer at the Brookfield Zoo…). Next time, I promised, I was going to get in FRONT of the elephant.
I cringed in horror as I listened to the Supreme Court debate on health care reform, and not for the reasons you may otherwise suspect. What concerned me greatly, and which is something which ultimately has an impact on the retirement industry, was the common reference by SCOTUS (Supreme Court of the Untied States) to insurance as a "product," and without effective response from the Solicitor General. Insurance is a financial service, not a product; it is the commercial pooling of interests by policyholders to spread risk. It is no more a product than depositing funds in a brokerage account to buy stocks.
I cringed when I realized that we in the industry really have no one to blame but ourselves.
When I first joined the insurance industry, the management consulting firms were working with insurance companies to address insurance's pretty bad reputation. The term "insurance" had fallen into such ill-repute that even long term industry professionals became reluctant to say that word. I sat through a number of industry meetings where I was amazed at the seeming repulsion at using it. What grew from all of that was an easy way out: instead of referring to insurance policies, we would just instead refer to them as "products." Or, in the retirement world, "retirement products." Even today, look hard to see how often you see reference to a "group annuity contract "or "insurance policy" in the materials where your plan may have purchased one. It has to be disclosed by state regulation, but you'll only find it in the smallest print possible and in the most innocuous way. You are not going to see it highlighted in the midst of the marketing material, to be sure.
At first I railed against this practice. I had just come in from a manufacturing company where real, tangible product was being produced. Insurance, I insisted, was not cereal. Establishing the terms of an insurance policy is NOT "manufacturing," as the industry started to call it. It was, at best, annoying, and I believed a bit misleading.
I believe strongly in the commercial pooling of interests; it is one of those areas where good social policy and good business practices meet for the betterment of all. I 'm afraid that, on more than one occasion, I did get on my soapbox to claim that we had nothing to be ashamed of by being in the "insurance business", as long as we did it right. It is, after all, the selling of unique knowledge.
Over time, however, I fell prey to the same practice. You may note in my "elevator speech" description of my law practice, I discuss "retirement products and services." But now all of that is coming home to roost.
The commercial pooling of interest is a complicated matter. Just think about the number of actuaries an insurance company may have (Lincoln, at its height, had 130 of them, and a formal actuarial recruitment, training and rotation program-complete with a sort of hierarchy that only an actuary can comprehend and appreciate) and the seemingly mind-numbing work they do. Even the recent QLAC regulations required the use of an actuary, and some of the terms are difficult, at best. The complications, the risks, and the reliance as a society we have on this pooling is also the reason it is so heavily regulated, in ways no box of cereal is.
It is all about providing financial services. No tangible product is made which can be handled and sold. Instead, we are talking about providing money and knowledge to policyholders under certain defined circumstances.
In the retirement world, for example, I have often referred to distributed annuity contracts as being "in kind" distributions, as it simplifies matters greatly. But as we delve deeper into the regulation of these things, we do ourselves a great disservice-and are likely to to get the regulations wrong- if we view insurance as a product as opposed to a package of financial services; it is about the way we appropriately regulate the pooling of our financial interests.
Insurance is not a cell phone. It is not even broccoli.
The successful chair of a committee serves the committee, the committee does not serve the chair. And so it was with the creation of the just-released "best practices" 403(b) Model Disclosure, which was developed jointly by NEA, ASBO, NTSAA and ASPPA. I was fortunate enough, and honored, to serve as the chair of that group. I have chaired and served probably more than my fair share of retirement industry related committees over the course of my nearly 30 year career, but this effort was incredibly different: the driving force was not vendor interests, government policy interests, or of those serving our profession. From early on, the focus was instead plan participants, to get to participants in non-ERISA 403(b) plans (and, in particular, employees of school districts) information that would be useful and inmportant in their purchase of 403(b) retirement products. Lisa Sotir-Ozkan from NEA Benefits and Melody Douglas from ASBO very much drove the process, and kept us focused on this goal.
Cloning 408(b)(2) or 404a-5 wasn't sufficient, nor was relying on those thick prospectuses that accompany variable 403(b) contracts. As valuable as the DOL disclosure schemes are in the employer-sponsored, institutional context, and as important as prospectuses are in protecting investor interests, they the lack simplicity -or obscure in volumes of other data- that which is particulalry important to the individual 403(b) participant. These plan particpants are not fiduciaires, and often do not have anyone to be able to collect and compare data on their behalf. They are sold investment products directly. So it really becomes a very simple issue for that school teacher or adminstrator: how much sales commissions is my investment generating; what services am I getting in return; is there a way for me to compare it all; and how can I reasonably access comparative data on the investemnts themselves?
There is the practical problem: whatever would be recommended also had to be doable by the 403(b) vendor providing the product, so disclosure was based upon information that was already being collected in some way by providers in the ERISA world. The committee also recognized the value of the comparatve format for investments under 404a-5 (and the significant investment being made in those dsclosures), and took advantage of the benfits of that work by recommending their use here.
The Committee, with skillful drafting support and guidance from ASPPA's Deb Davis and with Craig Hoffman's ongoing involvement in our work, put in serious time over the past 6 mohts to balance the useful with the doable. Along with Lisa and Melody, Aaron Friedman, Carol Gransee, Chris Guanciale, Scott Betts and Theresa Ward put together what I consider a pretty good piece of "engineering." Having known engineers from from my days in Michigan, who have told me that successful engineering is really the art of successful compromise (as, they have said, you cannot have the fastest, strongest AND most fuel efficent vehicle in one; its always a balance between them all), this group can lay claim to a pretty good result.
We all recognize that this first effort was not perfiect, and pratcice will be a good teacher for us as we try to bring a new level of transaprency into play. There is likely to be changes as we find out what we really did here. But its a pretty good start.
Retirement plan lawyers, both in house and outside counsel, may well want to take note of Bank of New York Mellon's recently reported troubles related to potentially widespread and fraudulent use of unfair currency exchange rates in their dealings with unsuspecting state and local pension plans. If there is a basis for these charges, and f they were as widespread and as sustained as alleged to be, we may have our first prime example of how SOX Section 307 and SEC's "Part 205" Rules (which implement Section 307) can implicate employee benefit lawyers. This is because it would be hard to believe that there wasn't a lawyer somewhere in the organization that shouldn't have been aware of the practice (as these rules apply not only to corporate law staffs, but to lawyers in the business lines as well).
Much of the Sarbanes Oxley Act n 2002 ("SOX") was designed to address many of the corporate abuses arising from the Enron, Tyco and Worldcom fiascoes, and it included enhanced protections for corporate whistleblowers. Buried within this statute was Section 307, an obscure section which imposed duties upon lawyers who deal with publicly traded companies the duty to "report up" certain corporate malfeasance of which they became aware in their practice. The challenge with these rules is they seem to clash, in many respects, with the state law rules governing the attorney client privilege. In house counsel have challenging enough circumstances, where their client is the corporation and not the officers who seek their counsel. This awkward pressure merely increased with the passage of SOX. The stakes became higher, as well: failure to report properly would effectively result in a ban from ever representing a publicly traded client, whether in house or as outside counsel.
I wrote an analysis describing the impact of Part 205 on employee benefit lawyers for ALI-ABA in 2005. In that article, I struggled to describe sensible circumstances where benefit lawyers would be impacted, and where the reporting up obligation would be imposed. This is because the only corporate malfeasance required to be reported under SOX are those which would result in a material impact on the company's financials, and it seemed at the time that it would be one heckuva stretch to reach the materiality standard in our line of work.
BNYMellon really is an eye opener. For manufacturing companies, there really is rare opportunity for the employee benefit lawyer to trip Part 205 obligations, other than issues related to underfunded pension plans and executive stock programs. BNYMellon, however, demonstrates that this is a very real possibility for attorneys representing financial service companies which do retirement business. Considering the fact the value of retirement plan holdings are some 85% of the value of publicly traded securities in the U.S., and where many companies' financial stake in the retirement business continues to grow, it occurs to me that the potential circumstances where SOX may be implicated will only become greater.
Part 205 requires the establishment of written procedures to insure compliance. Though pure corporate, tax and M&A lawyers have always been well versed in such matters, financial service companies may want to check these procedures to make sure that retirement law staffs (including those in the business lines) are well within the loop.
For those curious on the nuts and bolts of the operations of Part 205 in the employee benefit practice (and there are quite a few), I invite you to read the ALI-ABA paper.
Many in the industry saw early on, and tried to address, the terrible disruption caused by the change in 403(b) regulations during the recession. In many circumstances, the transition to the new rules made amounts in many 403(b) contracts unavailable at a time when many teachers and employees of not-for-profit organizations (who were among the hardest hit by the collapse) needed them the most-as loans, hardship distributions, or terminating distributions during times of often grievous financial circumstances.
401(k) plans did not suffer that fate, and I really believe that this recession would have been many times worse had it not been for those defined contribution balances (including 403(b) plans) which acted as a reserve for those who lost their jobs. I have not yet seen anyone research on those numbers, but the anecdotal evidence appears strong.
Much of the literature being published today talks of how the recession, and the related capital losses within DC account balances, speak strongly of the need to preserve that accumulation from future shocks by using those balances to purchase guaranteed income products. I cannot disagree more strongly. Many of you know from my writings that I am a strong supporter of guaranteed lifetime income but, I think instead, that the recession demonstrated the huge value of the DC account balance plan: it provided an invaluable cushion to many at a time they needed it most, which would have been otherwise unavailable in a DB type of arrangement. These plans had not been so widely available during economic shocks in the past.
But there are, and continue to be, huge inequities related to government policies related to the handling of DC plans throughout the recession.
At a time when it was necessary to provide substantial assistance to large financial institutions in many-and now we found out, often hidden-ways (yes, I am a devotee of Gretchen Morgenson and her weekly column in the New York Times), those who were unemployed continued to pay a 10% penalty tax on their defaulted loans and DC distributions which were taken to keep them afloat. The operation of the 10% was, and is, especially cruel, as it is paid regardless of the application of the marginal rate or deductions. So, even if income was so little as to pay little or no tax, the 10% penalty still applied.
The practical effect is that the unemployed were funding, even if in the smallest part, the assistance to large financial orgs which received substantial government support (and, apparently, paid large bonuses from those funds to many of their still employed executives and traders). Regardless of political persuasion, most should have difficulty with this proposition.
Now, as the economy recovers, and hopefully employment returns, many in Congress speak of reducing the amount that can be put into DC plans. Any reduction will have at least two unintended effects which are little mentioned: it will substantially reduce the ability of re-employed participants to rebuild those depleted balance which helped sustain during the recession; and it will seriously impair the ability of all to build that so-important-cushion for future financially crises. I would make the case that the smartest thing Congress could do right now is to increase the DC limit, as least for an interim period, to allow balances to be rebuilt.
We do not hear about this much, as it is being suffered by those without a voice: the unemployed and underemployed; those who are being treated so cruelly by the system in which they had, at one time, been invested. But it is all very real, nonetheless.
T his has become my "annual Mother's Day" posting, which hopefully helps describe the importance of what we do:
ERISA wonks such as ourselves tend to get lost in the press of details which seem to flow non-stop from our regulators and legislators in D.C. It is sometimes helpful to step back and see the personal impact of the things we do.
A few years back, a good friend of mine who ran the retirement plan operations of a large insurance company asked me to speak about ERISA to a meeting of his administrative processing staff. At the time, they were still struggling with some of the more difficult administrative processes related to the QJSA and QPSA rules. Here's what I told them:
My father died at Ford's Rouge Plant in 1970, after 20 years with the company. Back then, the normal form of benefit under a defined benefit plan was a single life annuity, covering the life of only the employee. There was no such thing yet as a qualified joint and survivor annuity or a qualified pre-retirement survivor's annuity. This meant that my father's pension died with him. My mother was the typical stay-at-home mother of the period who was depending on that pension benefit for the future, but was left with nothing. With my father's wages topping at $13,000 annually and five kids at home, there was also little chance to accumulate savings.
The Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (a copy of which I still keep in my office) was designed to change all of that. By implementing the requirement of a spousal survivor annuity, a whole class of non-working spouses received protection which was desperately needed. So in that speech to my friend's administrative staff, I asked them to take a broader view-if just for a moment- of the important task they were being asked to implement. It was valuable social policy with real, human effect which they were responsible for pulling off, and they should take a measure of pride in the work they were doing.
Things have evolved much over the years, and some of those same rules which provided such valuable protection have become the matter of great policy discussions centering on whether they are appropriately designed, and whether they can be modified in a way to accommodate new benefits like guaranteed lifetime income from defined contribution plans. But the point is that Congress sometimes gets it right, and there is very valuable social benefit often hidden in the day to day "grunge" of administering what often seems to be silly rules.
Mom, by the way, is still alive and doing well.
Unless you have been living under a rock for the past two weeks, you are probably aware of the pitched battle currently taking place in several states over proposed changes to the rights and benefits currently extended to state employees. In fact, Democrat legislators from Wisconsin and my own home state of Indiana have fled to Illinois (apparently, the asylum hot spot for lawmakers on the lamb) in an attempt to deny their state’s legislatures the quorum necessary to enact the proposed reforms.
While I rarely shy away from expressing my opinion on the political issues of the day, it is not my intent to weigh in on the broader debate regarding the role of public employee unions. In fact, I would note that Bob Toth (with whom I practice) and I come from decidedly different sides of the political spectrum. However, as attorneys focused on retirement plan issues, there is one aspect of the current debate on which we agree; namely, that states, like most private employers before them, need to shelve their current approach of handling their defined benefit plans.
This is not a new issue for either of us. Bob actually penned an article and a follow-up noting the limitations of traditional pension plans back in 2009 and, in 2010, I based my campaign for the Indiana General Assembly on a pledge to address our state’s public retirement plans (which were estimated to face a funding gap of almost $47 billion). While my run for public office was unsuccessful, I was recently asked to testify in favor of a bill (SB 524), which would require the state to study the prospect of switching to a defined contribution plan to provide retirement benefits for public employees and teachers.
According to a recent article in the New York Times entitled “Pension Funds Strained, States Look at 401(k) Plans,” Indiana is not alone in realizing the risks posed by promising lifetime payments to public employees without proper funding. Furthermore, this trend is bound to continue as taxpayers become educated regarding the huge deficits currently faced by many public pension plans. As I noted in my testimony to the Indiana Senate Committee on Pensions and Labor, unlike private plans, public pension funds have been permitted to discount future liabilities based upon projected future annual investment returns.
For example, Indiana’s retirement funds assume a 7.25% annual return when projecting the current funding necessary to provide promised benefits to future retirees. However, according to Standard & Poor’s, the total return of S&P 500 over the past five years was just 2.4%! Furthermore, according to Joshua D. Rauh, who is with the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University, even if Indiana’s retirement funds were to achieve an average annual return of 8% on their investments, they would still run out of cash by 2019 (assuming cost of living adjustments based upon a 3% inflation rate).
Unfortunately, few state legislators know how to manage their own retirement portfolios, let alone the complex requirements of a multi-billion pension fund. However, as noted, the potential risk to future state finances posed by these plans is enormous. Our firm has offered its expertise to Indiana lawmakers to assist them in designing a program that will assist public employees in achieving income security at retirement while also protecting state taxpayers. In this regard, we are fortunate to have associations with several prominent think tanks from which we can derive additional support.
We would urge other retirement plan professionals to do the same; namely, take a look at the public retirement plans in your own state to determine if they are in need of additional professional guidance. As the saying goes, “The cobbler’s children go unshod.” However, let’s not let this maxim apply to the retirement plans managed by our state and local governments when we can offer assistance - either directly or through referrals to qualified experts. Our own financial future may depend upon helping them manage their way out of this current crisis.
Continue Reading...
___________
Any discussion on any tax issue addressed in this blog (including any attachments or links) is not intended to be used, and cannot be used, for purposes of avoiding penalties imposed under the United States Internal Revenue Code or promoting, marketing or recommending to another person any transaction or tax-related position addressed therein. Further, nothing contained herein is intended to provide legal advice, nor to create an attorney client relationship with any party.
One of the most maligned and misunderstood, yet one of the most valuable (and one of my favorite), DC plan investments is the the insurance company general account investment-typically referred to as the "fixed fund," the "guaranteed fund," or even sometimes the "stable value fund"(in some of its iterations). These funds guarantee principal and a certain rate of return over a stated period of time. These funds usually (except in an inverted yield environment) provide a much higher rate of return over money market funds, while providing a measure of security of which money market funds can only dream. if the insurance company properly balances liquidity with the rate of return, it is an invaluable offering.
The downside to these funds is that the higher rate of return is often keyed to liquidity restrictions. Dick Van Dyke, in a song from the classic movie "Mary Poppins," actually does a great job of describing why this must be, in "Fidelity Fiduciary Bank." He tries to describe to his employee's son, Michael, the value of these investments:
You see, Michael, you'll be part of
Railways through Africa
Damns across the Niles
Fleets of ocean greyhounds
Majestic self, amortizing canals
Plantations of ripening tea.
Its tough making a short term payout from an investment in an "amortized canal." You see, insurance company general accounts are truly great capital investment vehicles. U.S. life insurers (who offer these investments) held in 2008, according to the ACLI, some $4.6 trillion-12% of which are invested directly in such things as planes, trains and automobiles, and other things upon which the development of world's infrastructure seriously relies, while also purchasing (at much greater levels) the bonds which allow these infrastructure investments to be built. Investing in these general account funds is truly taking part in an unusual sort of investment in which most plans-or even the majority of mutual funds-do not have the scale, wherewithal or structure, to partake. These are, in short, pretty cool investments.
Bur insurers have often mishandled the balance between liquidity and return, often not paying sufficiently for the long term lock up, or sometimes by the application of seemingly mystical rules to the application of "market value adjustments" when cashing out early. The good funds still provide relatively high returns, while maintaining substantial liquidity.
So what does 408(b)(2) have to do with all of this? Arguably, everything. Ignoring the issue of insurer solvency for a moment, in a world where the lack of transparency translates into higher costs to plans, and where there is concurrently serious consideration being given to increased use of insurance guarantees (including those found in general account investments) to provide greater retirement security, the regs are eerily silent on insurance transparency. With all the discussion of being concerned with things like "indirect compensation" and trying to figure just how much revenue a party to the plan is generating from the plan, an important piece is missing.
Technically, how the regs accomplish its silence is by way of 2550.408b-2(c)(1)(iii)(A), which specifically excludes investment products under which the underlying investments are not considered plan assets under 2510.3-101. The DOL provided a good explanation on how this works in an information letter in 2004, explaining something called "guaranteed benefit policies."
This silence really is not the fault of the DOL reg writers. It is just that the standard manner in which we have grown to evaluate equity investments over the past couple of decades just does not match up well with centuries' long, valuable practices of pooled capital investment of insurance type of entities.
We do need to devise a useful way under which plans and their fiduciaries can shop these products, to understand whether the plan is being paid sufficiently for its risk in accepting liquidity restrictions, and generally what sort of revenue (note, not profit) the insurance company expects to generate over time from the plan. Here, the risk is not so much insurer insolvency, but being locked into a relatively poor (meaning, not competitively priced for a similar investment) portfolio rate-yes, these general account managers do sometimes screw up, though the state regulatory structure helps minimize catastrophic errors. It is a risk for which the plan should be properly paid. Where there is not adequate consideration for that risk, the plan's contract needs to notify the plan of changing rates, and the ability to reasonably get out of the contract if the rates go south.
From the fiduciary side, it would seem appropriate to be paid for a long term interest rate risk. If there is insufficient return for that risk, then the contract purchased needs to provide liquidity.
_____________________
Any discussion on any tax issue addressed in this blog (including any attachments or links) is not intended to be used, and cannot be used, for purposes of avoiding penalties imposed under the United States Internal Revenue Code or promoting, marketing or recommending to another person any transaction or tax-related position addressed therein. Further, nothing contained herein is intended to provide legal advice, nor to create an attorney client relationship with any party.
We have posted a number of blogs and otherwise written over the past year discussing the growing role of the SEC in the retirement plan market. See, especially, the article on the SEC' sand DOL's "Cross Agency Waltz." The ERISA sessions at the National Society of Compliance Professionals, at which I spoke, were particularly well attended.
The fact that the DOL and the SEC held their first ever joint hearings in June, reviewing target date funds, is further evidence of the SEC's continued interest in a field which has been traditionally dominated by the Treasury and Department of Labor.
The SEC's rules have always had particular applicability to the 403(b) marketplace. But the SEC also has leverage into the 401(k) market, a market which often pays scant attention to the agency. in addition to the SEC's authority to regulate registered investment products, a participant's interest in a 401(k) plan is still, legally, a "security" under its jurisdiction. 401(k) plan interests may be exempted from the registration and filing requirements of the '33 and '34 Acts, but they ARE NOT exempted from those laws' anti-fraud provisions. So, the agency has every right to investigate fraudulent activities related to the provision of 401(k) plans to plan participants. This is particularly why last year's Memorandum of Understanding between the SEC and the DOL-promising cooperation at the investigation and enforcement level- becomes so critically important to retirement plan consultants and practitioners. It will be interesting to see what level of SEC/DOL cooperation we see coming out of the DOL's Consultant and Adviser Program, which is investigating abusive practices of pension advisers.
This is all reinforced by an October 22, 2009 speech to the AARP by Mary Schapiro (Chair of the SEC), reported in BNA Pension and Benefits Daily. Here is an excerpt from that speech which really puts the retirement plan community on notice:
"In my view, financial service firms should engage in responsible product development in the retirement market. Barraging investors with retirement products that feature the latest financial gimmick or marketable fad will not ultimately serve investors’ interests.
America’s future retirees deserve products that they can understand and evaluate. This means that complex fee arrangements or product descriptions should be discarded in favor of simple, clear disclosure.
Our future retirees should have access to products that will help them meet their retirement goals without imposing inappropriate risks. Products offering enhanced leverage and avant-garde investment techniques may be appealing to those investors that want to speculate. But they are not the type of investment products that belong in the retirement portfolio of the average American seeking to provide for security in retirement.
In addition, extolling the eye-popping results of the short-term performance of certain investment products, without focusing on the long-term implications or risks, can result in disappointed investors and potentially angry plaintiffs — not to mention an SEC prepared to be aggressive in enforcing the investor protection rules.
These types of disclosure, product development and marketing issues surrounding retirement products will be areas of focus in the coming year for those of us at the SEC. The burden imposed on those investing for retirement is significant, especially after the market events of last year and we must be committed to assisting those investing for retirement."
If you didn't believe it before, you probably really need to take notice now. The SEC is very interested in your world.
Any discussion on any tax issue addressed in this blog (including any attachments or links) is not intended to be used, and cannot be used, for purposes of avoiding penalties imposed under the United States Internal Revenue Code or promoting, marketing or recommending to another person any transaction or tax-related position addressed therein. Further, nothing contained herein is intended to provide legal advice, nor to create an attorney client relationship with any party.
ERISA really did create some fundamental changes that has broad personal affect. This reposting of a blog I wrote last year provides a good Mother's Day reminder of the importance of the work we do:
ERISA wonks such as ourselves tend to get lost in the press of details which seem to flow non-stop from our regulators and legislators in D.C. It is sometimes helpful to step back and see the personal impact of the things we do.
A few years back, a good friend of mine who ran the retirement plan operations of a large insurance company asked me to speak about ERISA to a meeting of his administrative processing staff. At the time, they were still struggling with some of the more difficult administrative processes related to the QJSA and QPSA rules. Here's what I told them:
My father died at Ford's Rouge Plant in 1970, after 20 years with the company. Back then, the normal form of benefit under a defined benefit plan was a single life annuity, covering the life of only the employee. There was no such thing yet as a qualified joint and survivor annuity or a qualified pre-retirement survivor's annuity. This meant that my father's pension died with him. My mother was the typical stay-at-home mother of the period who was depending on that pension benefit for the future, but was left with nothing. With my father's wages topping at $13,000 annually and five kids at home, there was also little chance to accumulate savings.
The Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (a copy of which I still keep in my office) was designed to change all of that. By implementing the requirement of a spousal survivor annuity, a whole class of non-working spouses received protection which was desperately needed. So in that speech to my friend's administrative staff, I asked them to take a broader view-if just for a moment- of the important task they were being asked to implement. It was valuable social policy with real, human effect which they were responsible for pulling off, and they should take a measure of pride in the work they were doing.
Things have evolved much over the years, and some of those same rules which provided such valuable protection have become the matter of great policy discussions centering on whether they are appropriately designed, and whether they can be modified in a way to accommodate new benefits like guaranteed lifetime income from defined contribution plans. But the point is that Congress sometimes gets it right, and there is very valuable social benefit often hidden in the day to day "grunge" of administering what often seems to be silly rules.
Mom, by the way, is still alive and doing well.
The mantra of Congress, investment advisors and the DOL over the past decade has been consistent: retirement plan assets must be invested in such a way to provide American workers with sufficient assets upon which to actually retire comfortably. This is as basic as apple pie, and a concept with which one can hardly disagree. It has even been the driving force behind regulatory efforts like the QDIA regs, where stable value or insurance investment options were openly scorned as appropriate default investment options.
As laudable as these efforts have been in the past, and as sound as they still may be, encouraging investment gain for the purpose of providing adequate retirement gain is NOT and has NEVER been the standard by which fiduciaries are judged.
ERISA Section 404(a)(1)(b) is written pretty clearly:
...a fiduciary shall discharge his duties.... by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly imprudent to do so."
There is no talk of maximizing gain. There is no language about providing any particular level of income. There is nothing about testing to see what level of return is needed to maintain a lifestyle. There is no discussion of age based target funds. It is truly based upon the concept of preserving the assets of the trust.
It is important to re-find this lost concept, particularly as fiduciaries review their investment policies to test whether they are adequate under the current market conditions. This is not an argument against the use of equities, merely that the manner in which one fulfills the duty to minimize large loss necessarily includes investments designed to preserve capital.
In our anger at AIG, Bank of America, Merrill Lynch and the other holding companies which have sorely abused the public and marketplace trust, we need to recognize the many good men and women in those organizations who will and do put their shoulders to the wheel without demanding ransom; those who believe in their organizations, the work they do and in their fellow employees who are struggling to make their companies work. It is sad that they will now take the heat for their abusive leaders. It is often their pay which was first cut, their budgets and staffs first reduced, their jobs first eliminated, even while their executives paid each other far too well.
I sorely hope that the compensation consultants who have had their way in the design of outrageous executive compensation programs do not hold sway in their arguments that exorbitant pay is necessary to attract and maintain a high level of executive talent. Many of us who have counseled the financial services industry over the years do hold many executives in the highest regard, and remain confident in their leadership and heart. They are also disgusted by what they see is happening. But we have also seen far too many of them who have gained a position of high authority (and with the concurrent ability to amass great wealth) by their political adroitness rather than business insight; and have seen those who have arrived at positions of inflated pay not by possession of any unusual skill or knowledge, but merely by serendipity and the abuse of the customer's trust.
Let us be careful in our anger, though. Let us make sure that those who work in those companies, the bulk of them, those who do the hard work of designing and operating fine retirement programs, do not become the inadvertent targets of our rage. They have suffered their fools for far too many years, and they know it. It would be unfair now to heap any further insult on them which would only add to the indignities they themselves have suffered over the years from such corrupt leadership.




