Continuing the DB Demise Discussion

I blogged a couple of weeks ago on the DB demise because of what I was seeing my current work on DC annuities, triggered by an interesting e-mail discussion string between fellows of the American College of Employee Benefits Counsel

But then the PBGC held a 35th anniversary forum shortly thereafter, extolling the idea of revitalizing the current DB system.  I thought this made it an opportune time to further the discussion.

The December 7 Forum on DB plans seem to hit it mostly right  in its calling the attention to the fundamental value of employers providing "guaranteed income for life" to employees. The National Institute on Retirement Security also reported on the meeting, noting the  critical role of Defined Benefit Plans, calling them the "Real Deal." The NIRS has also published its vision with which one can hardly argue. Under a high quality retirement system retirement system: 

  • employers can offer affordable, high quality retirement benefits that help them achieve their human resources goals;
  • employees can count on a secure source of retirement income that enables them to maintain a decent living standard after a lifetime of work;
  • the public interest is well-served by retirement systems that are managed in ways that promote fiscal responsibility, economic growth, and responsible stewardship of retirement assets

But here's where the problem lies. Juxtapose those statements with the following quote from "The Black Swan," by Nassim Nicholas Taleb, Random House, 2007:

"Consider the following sobering statistic.Of the five hundred largest U.S, Companies in 1957, only 74 were still part of that select group, the Standard and Poors 500, forty years later. Only a few had disappeared in merger; the rest either shrank or went bust." p.22

This where the PBGC, the NIRS and Pension Rights Center (which also presented at the conference) have it all wrong: the traditional DB plan does not, and will not, meet these laudable goals if you rely upon the private employer for the financial wherewithal to insure that the funding and fund management will be adequate. Plan sponsors can be terribly conflicted, with their own corporate financial needs creating economic pressure to engage in some sort  dangerous "creative accounting" in the management of these plans- which we have all too often seen in the past.  I am tempted to argue that public plans do not have this problem, and that they should get a "bye" on this concern. But think again. Many state and local governments are in serous trouble because of a disturbing lack of financial discipline, as they have not really had to "pay as you go" when promising very expensive benefits. Are not these promises really of the most cruel kind, when we find the money to pay for them really is not, nor ever can be, there?

The current DB system is premised on the notion that a private employer can more cost effectively provide this benefit. Logically, this cannot be true because of the lack of sensible pooling even in the largest employers. Some employers will be able to do so today because of their current demographics, but many cannot-and even those who can may find themselves in a bind in a decade or two. The only potential cost savings is in the profit charge on this guarantee issued by an insurer.

In effect, the system believes that it can do a better job at longevity risk management than regulated insurance companies, and to get that insurance for, in effect, free. When all is said and done, it is likely far from free. We are seeing the effect of the fallacy today, with only 19,000 DB plans now being covered by the PBGC.

So if the system REALLY needs a guaranteed lifetime benefit based upon employer sponsorship, one under which employers have the ability to choose the benefits (and thereby control the cost),  but one under which the employees should not be exposed to the vagaries of foolish business decisions of their  employers' senior management, what IS the answer?

I truly believe the answer lies in a private insurance system which provides Annuity Transparency, in annuities purchased through the employer sponsored system.  I'll talk about this on my next blog. For now, though, its back to the ski slopes of Quebec.... 

A footnote, added 12/21: Gretchen Morgenson reports in the Sunday NY Times  on a multi-billion dollar failure in the Alaska pension system, caused in large part by the alleged error of Mercer.  Again, my point: non-regulated institutions are ill-equipped to manage DB plans, particularly large ones. Had Alaska purchased insurance, the risk of error would have be borne by a well capitalized, highly regulated expert organization.

 

 

 

 

 

The private employer-sponsored defined benefit plan has had a good run of it, supporting two generations well in its goal of providing economic security  for retirees.  But the last 10 years have seen gradual though substantial decline in the number of employers sponsoring these plans, and in the percentage of employees being covered by these plans-now somewhere well south of 19% of the workforce is covered.The economic collapse has exacerbated the problem even further by exposing the weaknesses of the system, as the remaining DB plans are seeking funding relief from Congress.

You can find many sound opinions which attempt to explain this demise, from over-regulation, to difficult statutory schemes,  to the allure of defined contribution plans. If you step back, though, you can see that all of the reasons for the demise have a central theme: private employers are structurally ill-suited to bear the lifetime risk associated with providing this kind of benefit.

Think about it. Private business can, and indeed some must, fail. These companies  grow, expand and, ultimately either fail or need to be exposed to the risk of failure. There is a lot of conversation at the policy level about the evils inherent in having companies that are "too big to fail."  So what is the sense, then, to rely upon companies that we structurally need to fail from time to time to be responsible for funding a lifetime risk of their employees? One may claim that this is the function of the PBGC, but the PBGC doesn't specifically reserve for risks undertaken by plans. Its reserving system is ad hoc, at best.

Taking a close look at the current DB funding rules, you can see that they really require employers to have, or buy, sophisticated actuarial and investment expertise that you will only normally find in a regulated financial institution. We are, in effect, demanding our manufacturing base to become experts at insurance.

These employers are also seeing the changing nature of their workforce and retiree population, and they find that the DB Plan is unable to meet employee and retiree demands. DB Plans are, for the most part, proverbial “one trick ponies,” whose inflexibility has limited their usefulness in the current marketplace.

I have blogged on popular new annuity products in the marketplace, many of which are reliant upon sophisticated hedging strategies.  These innovative annuity products include features well beyond anything that could be offered in a traditional DB plan. These includes features like (but not limited to) the elective, periodic purchase of a pension guarantee with each payroll; the ability to access cash balances with minimum penalties; equity participation which will raise or lower the lifetime income guarantees; guaranteed minimum withdrawal benefits; guaranteed minimum income benefits with equity participation; and variable annuitization.  Employers who sponsor DB Plans are not in the business of developing and providing these sophisticated guarantees to meet changing employee and market needs. Additionally, plan sponsors generally have limited skills in even maintaining traditional DB benefits, much less having the resources to provide a wide variety of lifetime payout benefits which can adapt to change. They are also severely restricted by a regulatory scheme which discourages innovation. 

What is the answer? Most will agree that the former insurance schemes are sorely inadequate: inflexibility in pricing, little transparency, little portability, and irresponsible acting in some quarters has fueled the current economic mess. What the insurance industry DOES have is the necessary skills and regulatory scheme to guarantee and manage the solvency risks inherent  in guaranteeing life time income.  

Mark Iwry and Phylis Borzi both have recently noted noted their commitment (and cooperation) to providing a sensible regulatory scheme for providing annuitization from defined contribution plans, which will rely upon transparency, simplicity, relevancy and portability. To make this really work, we will need legislative relief as well, in such things as providing a "double 415" limit in such plans in order to provide the same sort of tax benefit which is available for sponsors of DB plans.

Should the insurance industry be able to answer this call, we may be able to finally have a sensible approach to providing retirement income from employer sponsored retirement plans.

 

For further discussion on this matter, see this link. 

 

 

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