Business of Benefits : Employee Benefits Lawyer & Attorney : Law Office of Robert J. Toth, Jr. : 403(b) Plans, Annuity & Insurance Law : Business of Benefits Blog

The DOL issued its highly anticipated 403(b) Frequently Asked Questions as part of a Field Assistance Bulletin, FAB 2010-01.  The seriousness in which the DOL is taking these 403(b) issues is reflected in the fact that it was issued as a FAB, and not merely the sort of informal guidance offered by a simple FAQ.  As one DOL staffer mentioned to me, though a FAB nay not have a whole lot more legal weight than an FAQ, it does speak to the weight the DOL is giving to the matters at hand.

There are now three DOL 403(b) FABs: 2007-2; 2009-2 and 2010-1.  The three of these should be read together when seeking answers, as they constitute substantial regulatory guidance.

This new FAQ was really designed to give plans and accountants some reporting and disclosure guidance as they attempt to put together their first, full fledged 403(b) Form 5500s, though it does also touch upon important ERISA coverage issues. It does not directly speak to some of the more pressing substantive 403(b) Title 1 issues (such as , what the heck is a 403(b) plan asset?), but it does say some interesting things. Hidden in the mundane, though, are quirks, gems and quirky gems-with a touch of the controversial. Lets sample a few:

GEMS

• Q12.  Yes, I am listing this one out of order because this is a High Quality Gem (according to Mr.Giller, there is no specific rating system for gems outside of diamonds, or I would use it here). The DOL extended its discussion of "good faith efforts" in applying the FAB 2009-2 exemptions. It specifically here recognizes that some "non 2009-2 exempted" contracts may not be able to be found. As long as the plan can demonstrate and document a good faith effort to find those contracts, and as long as "the guiding principle must be to ensure that appropriate efforts are made to act reasonably, prudently, and in the interest of the plan’s participants and beneficiaries"  (this is language from 2009-2),  the exclusion of these "non-findable/non-exemptable" contracts will not cause the 5500 to be rejected. Now, to convince your auditor to do cooperate will be something else-its that GAAP thing.
• Q3.  Knowing where the contract is, and who issued it, does not disqualify it from being excludable under 2009-2.
• Q11.  The DOL verified that 2009-2 extends beyond the 2009 reporting year.
• Q13. Cool. The DOL recognized the problem with the last payroll we have always had in 403(b) plans (and, to some extent 401(k) plans), particularly in with regard to testing 402(g) limits and, in the past, running MEAs:   making a deposit in 2009 from the last payroll in 2008 will not take the contract out of 2009-2.

 QUIRKS

• Q2. In a question designed to answer the question of whether loan repayments forwarded to a vendor by an employer on a contract that otherwise qualifies under 2009-2 for reporting relief takes the contract out of 2009-2 (the answer is yes), an interesting question is raised. Many 403(b) loans are "self-billed", that is, they are paid directly by the plan participant to the vendor.  In a contract that is NOT exempted by 2009-2, do these payments need to be reported on the 5500? If so, what line would you use on Schedules H or I?
• Q6.  Okay guys, quit teasing us. You used that term again, "plan asset," but just in the context of what a "plan asset" isn't for the 2009-2 reporting purposes. We really need to know how the plan asset rules  apply in the individual contract context  for other minor  purposes, like fiduciary obligations. Please?
• Q14. There are two alternative conditions to allowing the applicability of 2009-2,where the employer decides to allow or not allow an optional plan feature (like loans):  a cost basis, that is, including or excluding would serve to increase plan costs; or where including the option could require the use of employer discretion in its execution. 
• Q15.  The DOL reiterated and affirmed its public stance that an employer hiring a TPA to make discretionary decisions is the same thing as exercising discretion, and cause the plan to fall out of the ERISA 403(b) safe harbor. The employer may, however, allow the purchase of a product where the product vendor exercises discretion without violating the safe harbor. This has the odd effect of allowing the vendor to subcontract out discretion to the same TPA that an employer could not.  In spite of its quirkiness, I believe (and there those who I respect which disagree) the reasoning for this is soundly based.

QUIRKY GEMS

• Q7. The DOL giveth, and the DOL taketh away.  It affirms that the right to determine whether any contract is exempted under 2009-2 is reserved to the Plan Administrator. BUT, it also introduces a new "ratting clause" (which is the term I also use to describe the obligation on Schedules A and C to report non-cooperative vendors): If the plan auditor doesn't agree with the employer, the auditor must note it in the audit report. I have had far too many disagreements with poorly trained, junior auditors on the 401(a) side to even remotely take a shining to this condition. 
• Q12.  Yes, I listed this as a High Quality Gem. But what makes this one also quirky is the odd reference to personal liability for those who were required to keep records but failed to do so.  In a world where employers and plans mostly kept no such records, and where this recordkeeping obligation was never really formally assigned, and much of it never really required because of the minimal 5500 requirement, it is truly a quirky reference.
• Q16.  My guess some readers were wondering where I would put this one.  It is truly interesting, and a Quirky Gem.  This is the question of whether the ERISA safe harbor requires a certain number of vendors, or whether a single vendor with a reasonable choice of investment options (whether it be in an annuity contract or in an open architecture program) will suffice. The DOL refrained from affirming some public statements on how many vendors are required to avoid losing the safe harbor;   it did reaffirm that the safe harbor refers to both "contractors" as well "investment products" separately; and it focused heavily on facts and circumstances.  It allows employers (or, more precisely, imposes the burden on the employer) to establish that the costs and administrative burdens on that employer justify a use of a single open architecture program or annuity contract.

In any event, attempting to claim protection of the safe harbor will require hard work and diligence and, ultimately, the cooperation of the vendor. 

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Any discussion on any tax issue addressed in this blog (including any attachments or links) is not intended to be used, and cannot be used, for purposes of avoiding penalties imposed under the United States Internal Revenue Code or promoting, marketing or recommending to another person any transaction or tax-related position addressed therein. Further, nothing contained herein is intended to provide legal advice, nor to create an attorney client relationship with any party.  

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In a lunch conversation with Kathy Elliott , (a CPA specializing in 403(b) audits) at the annual meeting of the TE/GE Councils in Baltimore (which, by the way was pulled off fantastically by Warren Widmayer (and a few others), in the face of a snowstorm of historic dimensions), we went into more detail on my blog on 403(b) plan disqualification.

In talking about what now seems to be the obvious, Kathy pointed out the absurdity of "disqualifying" an entire 403(b) plan: the employer suffers little direct tax sanction, and the burden of the employer's errors are borne by the employees. There is no "stick" to the "carrot and stick" combination that makes 401k plans work, according to Kathy.

Think about it. In a 401(a) disqualification, the employer will lose its tax deduction and suffer potentially significant tax penalties when disqualifying the plan.  There is no such penalty for the 501(c)(3) employer (except where there is UBTI) or school district.  So, should the plan fail eligible employer status, be discriminatory or have a failed plan document, what really is the impact on the employer? Well, it seems, it is only the feeble link upon which audits were based prior to the regulations: W-2 reporting failure, with its  current max penalty of $30 per W-2.  The real "sanction" is the threat to report as taxable all amounts contributed to employee accounts. Again, as is so often the case with the impact of these regulations (see, for example an earlier blog), it is the employees of these tax exempt organizations which are to suffer the brunt-and, this time, for things outside of their control.

The IRS will soon publish a new set of EPCRS rules, which are generally intended to update the program for the new 403(b) regs.It will be interesting to see whether these new rules will recognize this factor in the determination of the appropriate Audit CAP sanction, where the largest tax liability to the employer is really only W-2 based. Under the prior audits, any sanctions paid by the employer were really only part of a settlement agreement with the IRS, where it agreed not assess tax penalties against employees in return for the payment of a sanction. To its credit by the way, the IRS was not aggressive in imposing these penalties upon audit, and were extraordinarily reasonable where there was good faith attempts at compliance by the employer.

Please do not read this as any criticism of the IRS TEGE staffs, as they have the duties of interpreting and imposing an awful set of regs. Application of these regs are settling in nicely due to the thoughtful efforts of the dedicated staffs. There are really only a handful of difficult issues (from the tax side) which are yet open, and these are mostly  being worked on. But application of these regs are repeatedly demonstrating some really unusual effects-all related to the point that he basis of the 403(b) plan is the idea of an individual pension.

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 Co-authored by Richard Turner

One of my personal highlights of the just finished NTSAA Annual meeting in Palm Springs (the first under the joint auspices of ASPPA and NTSAA, which has all the looks of a marvelous arrangement for the 403(b) market), was a conversation with Richard Turner, my old friend and VALIC's top 403(b) lawyer.

Richard and I have been engaged in an odd sort of range war over the past two years on the level of liability a public school district has in relation to the manner in which it handles its 403(b) program. Early on (in late 2007, methinks), I gave a few speeches discussing the potential "fiduciary like" exposures school districts may have from mismanagement of their 403(b) programs. Richard responded with a lengthy paper differentiating 403(b) compliance duties from an employer’s decisions about how involved they choose to become in selecting individual investments. I responded in kind with a part of a paper for the National Association of School Boards (with Jack Lance, Fred Reish, Bruce Ashton, Dave Kolhoff and others) on the whole host of liabilities I see a school district bumping into. Of course, Richard replied with a few more things.  

Richard and I finally caught up with each other in Palm Springs. Richard grabbed my arm, saying "Bob, we have to talk. You're not serious about this broad school district fiduciary liability thing, are you?" My response was, of course, "and you're not seriously saying that school districts can never be held liable if they seriously mismanage their 403(b) programs, are you?"

Richard and I have been arguing about various tax and retirement questions for nigh on 20 years, so-as he put it-a singularity has occurred that may jeopardize the continued existence of the universe as we know it: we came to a general consensus on this issue. Here's where we ended up; we were never very far from each other's point:

Throughout this process, two primary areas of contention have been: (a) In those states that provide broad statutory protections for public school 403(b) plan sponsors, is there some type, or level, of employer activity that might weaken or forfeit those protections?  And, (b) To what extent, if at all, might certain uniform acts (such as prudent investor acts) that primarily govern the investment of state and local pension funds and certain trusts and estates, also apply to public school districts overseeing their 403(b) plans?

We've agreed that school districts which limit their plan involvement to coordinating plan compliance, either with central compliance oversight or by making sure vendors are talking to each either, and adopting a plan document, will  likely have little liability to participants for the investment selections the participants are permitted to make under the program. In these sorts of instances, many states have laws which protect districts from this "hands off" approach.

We've also agreed to the other end of the spectrum: where a school district (lets say in an effort to control compliance costs and to get a better priced product for its employees ) selects and negotiates a single investment platform (either open or closed architecture) and oversees the selection of investment options on that platform, it could be forfeiting some of those state law protections by voluntarily taking on the additional investment selection responsibilities (outside of the scope of 403(b) compliance duties), and in doing so could be exposing itself to "fiduciary-like" (or even, in some cases, state fiduciary law ) liability.   (It should be noted that in some states a public school is not permitted to take such actions.)  As another example, such liability concerns might arise if a district hd authrotiy, under the plan and the underlying investment products, to map existing dollars to new investments and elected to do so.

Where there needs to be much more discussion is where the  liability line is crossed in the "continuum" between these two points, though the answer could be different under the different laws in each state.

But where would we be if Richard and I agreed on everything?

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Any discussion on any tax issue addressed in this blog (including any attachments or links) is not intended to be used, and cannot be used, for purposes of avoiding penalties imposed under the United States Internal Revenue Code or promoting, marketing or recommending to another person any transaction or tax-related position addressed therein. Further, nothing contained herein is intended to provide legal advice, nor to create an attorney client relationship with any party.  

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 EBSA and the IRS issued their long promised Request For Information on annuities-or, should I say, as promised by the EBSA. We had not expected this particular piece to be a joint effort. It shows that Phyllis's and Mark's agenda is getting policy effectively done, not engaging in damning bureaucratic turf warfare. Hmm. With this and the recent DOL/ SEC activities, we may be seeing a trend here somewhere....

The RFI is extensive and well thought out (though they do reference  the GAO report I criticized in an earlier blog). There looks to be a lot of work put into the effort already, as it well identifies the key issues facing the idea of providing lifetime income streams.

Importantly, it does not make the mistake of focusing on "annuities." Instead, it focuses on how an adequate retirement policy addresses three key risks: longevity, Investment and Inflation (OK. So at least on THIS point the GAO report got it right).  I believe the recent attacks by the Investment Company Institute, as well as Jack Brennan, on "annuities" misses the point: there are solutions needed to each one of these risks, solutions which can have a critical role for mutual funds, investment managers and the insurance industry. This is NOT an industry specific effort, as one industry alone cannot address all three of these risks without the others.

As promised, the RFI focuses strongly on transparency (yes, yes, my Annuity Transparency blog is coming), relevancy for the average participant, portability and cost. But I was intrigued by the questions related to 404(c) and IB 96-1 (on participant education).  I am particularly interested in the insurer solvency issue, which to me is the key fiduciary risk (next to transparency), but you need to look closely in the RFI to find that issue.

The substance aside, one must be impressed by the process. We always thought the Borzi/Iwry combination would be an extraordinarily effective one, and this is proving to be true. Seeing these two longtime compatriots openly cooperate with the goal of effective public policy is something for which we have long waited.

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Any discussion on any tax issue addressed in this blog (including any attachments or links) is not intended to be used, and cannot be used, for purposes of avoiding penalties imposed under the United States Internal Revenue Code or promoting, marketing or recommending to another person any transaction or tax-related position addressed therein. Further, nothing contained herein is intended to provide legal advice, nor to create an attorney client relationship with any party.  

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